Magistri Petri Lombardi

Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

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Master Peter Lombard

Archbishop of Paris

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ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 23

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Cap. I.

De hoc nomine quod est persona, quod secundum substantiam dicatur, non singulariter, sed pluraliter accipitur in summa.

Chapter I.

On this name which is "Person", since it is said according to substance, it is accepted not singularly, but plurally in the Most High.

Praedictis[1] adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, singulariter et non pluraliter de omnibus in summa dicantur personis, ut supra ostensum est,[2] est tamen unum nomen, scilicet persona, quod secundum substantiam dicitur de singulis personis et pluraliter, non singulariter in summa accipitur. Dicimus enim: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, et hoc secundum substantiam dicitur. Nec tamen dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una persona, sed tres personae. Hoc ergo nomen excipitur a praedicta[3] regula nominum, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, quia cum hoc ad se dicatur et secundum substantiam, pluraliter tamen, non singulariter in summa accipitur.

To the aforesaid[1] there must be added, that since all the names, which are said of God according to substance, are said singularly and not plurally of all the Persons in the Most High (Trinity), as has been shown above,[2] there is, however, one name, that is "person", which is said according to substance of Each Person and is plurally, not singularly, accepted in the Most High (Trinity). For we say: 'the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person', and this is said according to the substance. And yet there is not said: 'the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person', but (rather) 'are three persons'. Therefore this name is excepted from the aforesaid[3] rule for the names, which are said of God according to substance, because since this is said regarding Itself and according to substance, yet it is accepted plurally, not singularly, in the Most High (Trinity).

Quod autem persona secundum substantiam dicatur, Augustinus ostendit in septimo libro de Trinitate[4] dicens: « Non est aliud Deo *esse*, aliud *personam esse*, sed omnino idem ». Item:[5] « In hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quod est; ita et persona Patris

Moreover, that "person" is said according to substance, (St.) Augustine shows in the seventh book On the Trinity[4] saying: « It is not one thing for God *to be*, another *to be a person*, but (it is) entirely the same (thing) ». Likewise:[5] « In this Trinity, when we say "the Person of the Father", we do not say (something) other than the Substance of the Father. On which account, as the Substance

non aliud quam ipse Pater est; ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus et mangus et bonus et iustus et huiusmodi. Et quemadmodum hoc illi est *esse*, quod *Deum esse*, quod *magnum esse*, quod *bonum esse*; ita hoc illi est *esse*, quod *personam esse* ». Ecce expresse habes, quod persona secundum substantiam dicitur, ut cum dicitur: Pater est persona, hic sit sensus: Pater est essentia divina; similiter, cum dicitur: Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, id est essentia divina.

of the Father is the Father Himself, not whereby He is the Father, but that He is; thus also the Person of the Father is not other than the Father Himself; indeed "person" is said regarding Himself, not regarding the Son and/or the Holy Spirit, just as "God" and "great" and "good" and "just" and (names) of this kind are said regarding Himself. And according to the measure which for Him *to be* is that, which (is) *to be God*, which (is) *to be great*, which (is) *to be good*; so for Him *to be* is that, which (is) *to be a person* ». Behold you expressly have, that "person" is said according to substance, such as when there is said: 'the Father is a Person', here the sense is: 'the Father is the Divine Essence'; similarly, when there is said, 'the Son is a person', 'the Holy Spirit is a person', that is 'is the Divine Essence'.

Ideo oritur hic quaestio difficilis quidem, sed non inutilis, qua quaeritur, cur non dicantur hi tres una persona, sicut una essentia et unus Deus. Quam quaestionem Augustinus diligenter tractat atque congrue explicat in septimo libro de Trinitate[6] ita dicens: « Cur non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus, sicut unam essentiam et unum Deum, sed dicimus tres personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus? Quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servare huic significationi, qua intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interroganti, quid tres essent, cum tres esse fateamur ». « Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tres, ut ait Augustinus in libro quinto de Trinitate,[7] magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen *tres personae*, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino ». Non enim rei ineffabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet. Ecce ostendit, qua necessitate dicatur pluraliter *personae*, videlicet ut hoc uno nomine quaerentibus de tribus respondeamus.[8]

For this reason, there arises here an indeed difficult, but not unuseful, question, by which there is asked, why these Three are not said (to be) one person, just as (They are said to be) one Essence and one God. Which question (St.) Augustine diligently treats and congruously explains in the seventh book On the Trinity,[6] thus saying: « Why do we not say (that) these Three together (are) one person, just as (we say that They are) one Essence and one God, but we say (rather that They are) Three Persons, though we do not say (that They are) three gods, or three essences? Because we want also [vel] that some, one word [vocabulum] serve this signification, by which "Trinity" is understood, lest we would be entirely silent to one interrogating us, "What are the Three?", when we say that there are Three ». « When, therefore, there is asked, "What (are) the Three?" », as (St.) Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity,[7] « human speech labors head-on in great need [magna prorsus inopia]. Yet there has been said "Three Persons", not so that that would be said, but lest one would be entirely silent ». For the eminence of the ineffable subject [rei] does not prevail to be explained by this word. Behold, he shows, by what necessity there is said in the plural "persons", namely, so that we may respond[8] with this one name to those asking (us) concerning the Three.

[1] Codd. B E adiungunt *tamen*.
[2] Dist. XXII. c. 3.
[3] Codd. A B E *praescripta*.
[4] Cap. 6. n. 11, ubi sola Vat. pro *non est aliud Deo* perperam legit *non aliud Deum*, ed. 8 et cod. C *est Deum esse*.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid. immediate post. — Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd., ed. 1 et originale post *cum* addunt *tamen*. Paulo post eadem Vat. et paucae edd. *taceamus interrogati* pro *taceremus interroganti*.
[7] Cap. 9. n. 10.
[8] Codd. et ed. 1 *responderemus*, et paulo ante pro *dicatur* sola ed. 8 *dicantur*.

[1] Codices B and E add *however* [tamen].
[2] Distinction XXII, ch. 3.
[3] Codices A B and E read *the afore-written* [praescripta].
[4] Chapter 6, n. 11, where the Vatican edition alone faultily reads *that it is not one thing to be God* [non aliud Deum esse], and edition 8 and codex C *there is a being-God* [est Deum esse] for *It is not one thing for God to be* [Non enim est aliud Deo esse].
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., immediately after. — Here the Vatican edition and the other editions, contrary to the codices, to edition 1 and to the original, after *though* [cum] add *yet* [tamen]. A little after this the same Vatican edition and a few editions have *we be entirely silent, having been interrogated* [taceamus interrogati] for *we would be entirely silent to the one interrogating* [taceremus interroganti].
[7] Chapter 9, n. 10.
[8] The codices and edition 1 read *we would respond* [responderemus], and a little before this only edition 8 reads *by what necessity "persons" are said in the plural* [qua necessitate diantur pluraliter personae].

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Cap. II.

Qua necessitate dictum sit tres personae a Latinis, et a Graecis tres hypostases vel substantiae.

Qua necessitate non solum Latinus sermo, sed etiam Graecus eadem pene super hac re laborans nominum penuria coarctatur. Unde Augustinus, quid a Graecis vel a Latinis necessitate de ineffabili Trinitate dictum sit, aperiens, in septimo libro de Trinitate[1] ait: « Loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquod modo possemus, dictum est a Graecis *una essentia*, tres *substantiae*, id est una usia, tres hypostases. Aliter enim Graeci accipiunt substantiam quam Latini. A Latinis autem dictum est *una essentia* vel *substantia*, *tres personae*, quia non aliter in sermone nostro, id est Latino, essentia quam substantia solet intelligi. Et ut intelligatur saltem in aenigmate, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid, cum quaereretur, quid tria sint, quae tria esse[2] fides vera pronuntiat, cum et Patrem non dicit esse Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, scilicet Donum Dei, nec Patrem dicit esse nec Filium. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid *tria* vel quid *tres*, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod nomen, quo complectamur haec tria. Neque occurit animo, quia supereminentia

Chapter II*.*

By what necessity has there been said by the Latins "Three Persons", and by the Greeks "Three Hypostases and/or Substances".

By which necessity not only the Latin language [Latinus sermo], but also the Greek, laboring upon this matter, is constrained by nearly [pene] the same penury of names. Whence (St.) Augustine revealing [aperiens], what has been said of necessity by the Greeks and/or by the Latins of the ineffable Trinity, says in the seventh book On the Trinity:[1] « For the sake of speaking of ineffable (things), so that we might be able to speak in some manner, there has been said by the Greeks *one essence*, three *substances*, that is, one *ousia*, three *hypostases*. For the Greeks accept substance in another manner than the Latins. But by the Latins there has been said *one essence* and/or *substance*, *three persons*, because "essence" is not accustomed to be understood in another manner in our language, that is Latin, than "substance" (is). And to understand at least in an enigma, it has pleased (them) that it be said thus, so that something would be said, when there is asked, "What are the Three, which the True Faith pronounces to be[2] "three", when both one says that the

divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem excedit. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur et verius est quam cogitatur ».

Father is not the Son, and one says that the Holy Spirit, that is the Gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son?" When, therefore, it is asked, "What (are) the *three* (things)?" and/or "What (are) the *three (persons)*?", we confer to find some name, by which we comprise those Three. Nor does (a word) occur to (one's) spirit, because the supereminence of the Divinity exceeds the faculty of accustomed speech. For God is thought more truly than is said, and is more truly than is thought ».

« Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quoniam tres sunt, quid *tres* sint quaeramus, et quid commune habeant. Non enim possunt dici tres patres, quia tantum Pater ibi Pater est, nec tres filii, cum nec Pater ibi sit Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, nec tres spiritus sancti, quia Spiritus sanctus propria significatione, qua etiam[3] Donum Dei dicitur, nec Pater est nec Filius. Quid ergo tres? Si tres personae esse dicuntur, commune est eis id quod persona est ». « Certe enim, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo dicuntur tres personae ». « Propterea ergo dicimus tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est ».[4] Ex praedictis aperte intelligi potest, qua necessitate dictum sit a Latinis *tres personae*, cum persona secundum substantiam dicatur. Unde et tribus commune est id quod persona est.[5]

« Therefore, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since They are Three, let us ask, "What "three" are they?", and "What common (name) do They have?". For They cannot be said (to be) "three fathers", because only the Father is the Father There, nor "three sons", since neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit is the Son There, nor "three holy spirits", because the Holy Spirit by His own signification, by which He is also[3] said to be "The Gift of God", is not the Father nor the Son. Therefore, what (are) the Three? If They are said to be three persons, that which a "person" is, is common to Them ». « For certainly, because the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person, for that reason They are said (to be) "three Persons" ». « On this account, therefore, we say (that there are) Three Persons, because that which a "person" is, is common to Them ».[4] From the aforesaid it can be openly understood, by what necessity there has been said by the Latins "*three persons*", since "person" is said according to substance. Whence also that which a "person" is,[5] is common to the Three.

Cap. III.

Quare non dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres deos, ut tres personas.

Chapter III

For what reason do we not say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are "Three Gods", since (we do say that they are)"Three Persons".

Sed quaeritur hic, cum dicamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis quod pesona est, id est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona: cur non dicamus similiter tres deos, cum et Pater sit Deus, et Filius sit Deus, et Spiritus sanctus sit Deus? Quia scilicet illud Scriptura contradicit; hoc

But here there is asked, since we say, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are Three Persons, because what a "person" is, is common to Them, that is, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person: why do we not similarly say (that there are) "three gods", since the Father is also God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God?

autem, etsi non dicit, non tamen contradicit. Unde Augustinus hanc movens quaestionem atque definiens in libro septimo de Trinitate[6] ita ait: « Si ideo dicimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est; cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe, ut praedictum est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo tres personae dicuntur. Quia ergo Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spirtus sanctus Deus, cur non dicuntur tres dii »? Ecce proposuit quaestionem; attende, quid respondeat subdens:[7] « An ideo non dicuntur tres dii, quia Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicuibi Scripturae textus commemorat. An ideo licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres pesonas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit? Si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura dicens:[8] *Audi Israel, Deus tuus, Deus unus est* ». Ecce absolutio quaestionis, quare potius dicamus tres personas quam tres deos, quia scilicet illud non contradicit Scriptura.

Because, namely, Scripture contradicts the latter; but the former, even if it does not say (it), yet it does not contradict (it). Whence (St.) Augustine moving and defining this question in the seventh book On the Trinity[6] thus says: « If, for that reason, we say, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are Three Persons, because that which a "person" is, is common to Them; why do we not also say (that They are) "three gods"? Certainly, as has been said before, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, for that reason They are said (to be) "three persons". Therefore, because the Father (is) God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, whey are They not said (to be) "three gods" »? Behold, he has proposed the question; pay attention to what he responds, as he continues [subdens]:[7] « Or whether, for this reason, They are not said (to be) "three gods", because Scripture does not say (that They are) "three gods"? But neither does the text of Scripture anywhere commemorate "three persons". Or whether for this reason it was licit from the necessity of speaking and disputing to say (that They are) "three persons", not because Scripture says (it), but because Scripture does not contradict (it)? But if we were to say (that They are) "three gods", Scripture would contradict (us), saying:[8] *Hear o Israel, thy God, is one God* ». Behold the resolution [absolutio] of the question, for what reason do we say (that They are) "three persons" rather than "three gods", because, namely, Scripture does not contradict it.

Cap. IV.

Cur non dicimus tres essentias, ut tres personas.

Verum et hic alia emergit questio, quam Augustinus consequenter annectit dicens:[9] « Cur, inquit, et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod similiter Scriptura sicut non dicit, ita non contradicit? At si dicis, quod propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae, sed una essentiae; quaero, cur non propter eandem unitatem Trinitatis dicantur una persona, et non tres personae. Ut enim est illis commune nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, sic illis commune est personae vocabulum ». «

Chapter IV

Why do we not say "Three Essences", since (we do say) "Three Persons".

However, there also emerges here the other question, which (St.) Augustine consequently connected (with the former), saying:[9] « Why », he says, « is it not licit to say (that They are) "three essences", because similarly Scripture, just as it does not say (it), thus does not contradict (it)? But if you say, that on account of the Unity of the Trinity They are not said (to be) "tree essences", but "the one Essence"; I ask, why on account of the same Unity of the Trinity are They not said (to be) "one

Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur, loquendi necessitate a Graecis et Latinis parta haec vocabula adversus insidias vel errores haereticorum? Cumque conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis de Deo tenet sive per piam fidem sive per qualemcumque intelligentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non poterat dicere, non esse tria quaedam; quod quia dixit Sabellius, in haeresim lapsus est. Quaesivit ergo, quid tria diceret, et dixit tres personas sive tres substantias secundum Graecos ».

person", and not "three persons"? For as the name for the Essence is common to Them, such that any single One is said (to be) the Essence, in the same manner, the word for a Person is common to Them ». « What remains, therefore, unless that we say, that these words (were) born by the Greeks and Latins from the necessity of speaking against the traps [insidia] and/or errors of heretics? And since the human need for speaking strives to proffer to human sense, what it holds in the sacristy [secretario] of the mind concerning God, whether through pious faith or through any understanding whatsoever, it feared to say (that They are) "three essences", lest there would be understood in that most high Equality any diversity. Again it could not say, that there were not a certain Three; which because Sabellius has said (there were not), he had fallen into heresy. Therefore it asked, what it would say (that) the Three (are), and it said (that They are) "three persons" or "three substances", according to the Greeks ».

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[1] Cap. 4. n. 7. — Paulo ante Vat. cum nonnullis edd. omittit *a* ante *Latinis*. Verba in textu *id est* usque *quam Latini* inclusive a Magistro interpolata sunt.
[2] Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 post *quae tria esse* male addunt *tria*; edd. 5, 9 *quia tria esse fides*. [Trans. nota: In nota ista perperam legitur *Quae* pro prima *quae* et *:* pro *;*]
[3] Vat. et edd. 4, 8 omittunt *etiam*.
[4] Tres loci Augustini leguntur loc. cit. n. 7. et 8.
[5] Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 1 et omnes codd. addunt: *id est hoc nomen persona*.
[6] Cap. 4. n. 8. — Ex codd. et plurimis edd. adiecimus *ita* ante *ait*. In fine textus Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 bis addunt *est*, scil. post *Pater* et post *Filius*.
[7] Ibid. paucis interpositis. — Paulo ante Vat. contra codd. et plures edd. addit *hanc* ante *quaestionem*. In ipso textu cod. D post *textus* addit *scilicet novi et veteris Testamenti*.
[8] Deuter. 6, 4. Vulgata: *Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est*. Cum Magistro et Augustino legunt Ambrosius, libr. I. de Fide ad Gratianum c. 1. n. 6 et c. 3. n. 23; et Hilarius, libr. IV. de Trinitate n. 8. — Immediate post cod. D *solutio* loco *absolutio*. Deinde pro *illud* ed. 6 *illi*.
[9] Ibid. immediate post, et quod sequitur n. 9. — In fine primi textus ed. 1 post *vocabulum* addit *et essentiam praedicat*.

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[1] Chapter 4, n. 7. — A little before this the Vatican edition, together with not a few editions, omits *by* [a] before *the Latins* [Latinis]. The words in the text *that is . . . than the Latins* [id est . . . quam Latini] has been interpolated by Master (Peter).
[2] Only the Vatican edition and editions 4 and 6, read badly *which . . . the Three to be "three"* [quae tria esse tria etc.]; editions 5 and 9 read *because* [quia] for *which* [quae]. [Trans. note: In this footnote the first *quae* was failty capitalized, and there was a colon in place of the semi-colon.]
[3] The Vatican edition and editions 4 and 8 omit *also* [etiam].
[4] The three passages from (St.) Augustine are read in loc. cit., nn. 7 and 8.
[5] Here the Vatican edition and the other editions, contrary to edition 1 and all the codices, add [Trans. note: faultily] *that is, this name "person"* [id est hoc nomen persona].
[6] Chapter 4, n. 8. — From the codices and very many editions, we insert *thus* [ita] before *says* [ait]. At the end of the text, the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, and 5 twice add *is* [est], namely after *the Father* [Pater] and after *the Son* [Filius].
[7] Ibid., with a few (words) interposed. — A little before this, the Vatican edition, contrary to the codices and very many editions, adds *this* [hanc] before *question* [quaestionem] [Trans. note: in place of *the*].
[8] Dt. 6:4. The Vulgate reads: *Hear o Israel, the Lord, our God, the Lord is One* [Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est]. (St.) Ambrose in On the Faith to Gratian, Bk. I, ch. 1, n. 6 and ch. 3, n. 23,

reads (the verse in the same way) with Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine; and (St.) Hilarly (likewise), On the Trinity, Bk. IV, n. 8. — Immediately after this codex D has *solution* [solutio] in place of *resolution* [absolutio]. Then edition 6 has *it* [illi] for *it* [illud].

9 Ibid. immediately afterwards, and what follow is from n. 9. — At the end of the first quote edition 1 adds *and predicates the essence* [et essentiam praedicat].

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« Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc de substantiis secundum Graecorum consuetudinem oportet intelligi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, id est tres hypostases, unam usiam; quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam vel substantiam »;[1] « quamquam et illi, si vellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, tres hypostases, possent dicere tres personas, tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt dicere, quia fortasse secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius dicitur ».

« For what one is bound to understand of "persons" according to our (language), this (one understands) of "substances" according to (that) of the Greeks. For in the same manner they say "the Three Substances" (are) "the one Essence", that is, "the Three Hypostases", "the one Ousia"; according to which manner we say "the three Persons" (are) "the one Essence and/or Substance" »;[1] « though they also, if they want, just as they say "three substances" (are) "three hypostases", they can say "three persons" (are) "three prosopa". But they preferred to say the former, because perhaps, according to the custom of their own tongue, it is more aptly said ».

Cap. V.

Quod in Trinitate non est diversitas vel singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas et distinctio et identitas.

Chapter V

That in the Trinity there is not a diversity and/or singularity and/or solitude, but a Unity and a Trinity and distinction and identity.

Iam sufficienter, ut puto, ostensum est, qua necessitate dicamus tres personas, et quare non similiter tres deos vel essentias, quia scilicet in altero obviat Scriptura, in altero diversitatis intelligentia; quia ibi nulla penitus est diversitas, sicut nec singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro septimo de Trinitate[2] ait: « Humana inopia quaerens, quid diceret tria, dixit tres personas vel substantias, quibus nominibus non diversitatem voluit intelligi, sed singularitatem noluit, ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo, quod dicitur una essentia, sed trinitas ex eo, quod dicuntur tres personae ». Hilarius quoque in libro septimo de Trinitate[3] ait: « Dominus dicit:[4] *Qui me videt, videt et Patrem*. Cum hoc dicitur, excluditur singularis atque unici,

It has already been shown sufficiently, I think, by what necessity we say (that They are) "three persons", and for what reason we (do) not (say that They are) "three gods and/or essences", because, namely, in the one Scripture goes against it, in the other the understanding of a diversity (does); because there is throughly no diversity There, just as (there is) neither singularity and/or solitude, but (rather) a unity and trinity. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the seventh book On the Trinity[2] says: « Human need seeking, what it would say that the Three (are), said (that They are) "three persons and/or substances", by which names it wanted that a diversity not be understood, but (similarly) it did not want a singularity, so that not only a unity be

id est solitarii intelligentia. Nam nec solitarium sermo significat, et indifferentem tamen naturam professio docet. Visus est enim in Filio Pater per naturae unitam similitudinem. Unum sunt enim natus et generans, unum sunt neque unus. Non itaque solitarius Filius est nec singularis nec dispar ». Item in eodem:[5] « Sicut in Patre et Filio credere duos deos impium est, ita Patrem et Filium singularem Deum praedicare sacrilegum est. Nihil in his novum, nihil diversum, nihil alienum, nihil separabile est ». De hoc etiam Augustinus in libro Questionem veteris ac novae Legis[6] ait: « Unus est Deus, sed non singularis ». Item Ambrosius in libro de Fide[7] ait: « Quod unius est substantiae separari non potest, etsi non sit singularitatis, sed unitatis ». « Deus unus cum dicitur, nequaquam Deitatis trinitatem excludit et ideo non quod singularitatis, sed quod unitatis est praedicatur ». Ecce ex praedictis ostenditur, quod nec singularis nec diversus nec unicus vel solitarius confitendus est Deus, quia singularitas vel solitudo personarum pluralitatem excludit, et diversitas unitatem essentiae tollit. Diversitas inducit separationem Divinitatis, singularitas adimit distinctionem Trinitatis. Ideo Ambrosius in secundo libro de Fide[8] ait: « Non est diversa nec singularis aequalitas »; « nec iuxta Sabellianos Patrem Filiumque confundens, nec iuxta Arianos Patrem Filiumque secernens. Pater enim et Filius distinctionem habent, separationem vero non habent ». Item in eodem:[9] « Pater et Filius divinitate unum sunt, nec est ibi substantiae differentia nec ulla diversitas; alioquin quomodo unum Deum dicimus? Diversitas enim plures facit ». Constat ergo ex praedictis, quia in Trinitate nulla est diversitas; si tamen aliquando in Scriptura invenitur dictum *tres diversae personae* et huiusmodi, diversas dicit distinctas.

understood There from that, which is said (to be) “the one Essence”, but a trinity from that, which the Three Persons are said (to be) ». (St.) Hilary also in the seventh book On the Trinity[3] says: « The Lord says:[4] *He who sees me, sees also the Father*. When He says this, there is excluded the understanding of a singular and also a unique, that is, a solitary. For neither does (His) discourse signify a solitary (Person), yet (His) profession does teach an undiffering Nature. For the Father has been seen in the Son through a united similitude of nature. For one (Being) [unum] are the One born and the One Generating, They are one (Being) and not one (Person) [unus]. And so the Son is not solitary, nor singular nor disparate ». Likewise in the same (book):[5] « Just as in the Father and the Son it is impious to believe (that there are) two gods, so it is a sacrilege to preach that the Father and the Son (are) a singular God. Nothing among Them is new, nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable ». Of this also (St.) Augustine in the book The Question on the Old and New Law[6] says: « God is one, but not singular ». Likewise (St.) Ambrose in the book On the Faith[7] says: « What is of one substance cannot be separated, even if it belongs not to a singularity, but to a unity ». « When there is said “the One God”, there is not at all excluded the Trinity of the Deity and for that reason there is preached not what (belongs) to a singularity, but what (belongs) to a unity ». Behold, from the aforesaid it is shown, that God is neither to be confessed (to be) “singular”, nor “diverse” nor “unique” and/or “solitary”, because singularity and/or solitude excludes the plurality of Persons, and diversity bear off the Unity of the Essence. A diversity induces a separation of the Divinity, a singularity takes away the distinction of the Trinity. For that reason (St.) Ambrose in the second book On the Faith[8] says: « The equality is neither diverse nor singular »; « nor (is it an equality) according to the Sabellians, confounding the Father and the Son, nor according to the Arians, separating [secernens] the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son have a distinction, but They do not have a separation ». Likewise in the same (work):[9] « The Father and the

Son according to the Divinity are one (Being), nor is there a difference of substance nor any diversity There; otherwise in what manner do we say (that there is) one God? For diversity causes many (things to be) ». It is established, therefore, from the aforesaid, that in the Trinity there is no diversity; yet if, at some time, there is found said in Scripture (that there are) *three diverse Persons* and (sayings) of this kind, it means (that) the diverse (Persons are) distinct (Persons).

Cap. VI.

Quod non debet dici Deus multiplex.

Et sicut in Trinitate non est diversitas, ita nec multiplicitas, et ideo non est dicendus Deus multiplex, sed trinus et simplex. Unde Ambrosius in primo libro de Fide ait: « Est in Patre et Filio non discrepans, sed una divinitas, nec confusum quod unum est, nec multiplex esse potest quod indifferens est ». Multiplex itaque Deus non est.

Chapter VI

That God ought not be said (to be) "manifold".

And just as in the Trinity there is no diversity, so neither a multiplicity, and for that reason God is not to be said (to be) manifold [multiplex], bur (rather) Triune and Simple. Whence (St.) Ambrose in the first book On the Faith[10] says: « There is in the Father and the Son no discrepancy [non discrepans], but one Divinity, nor is what is One, confused, nor can what is un-differing, be manifold ». And thus God is not manifold.

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[1] Ibid. n. 8; sed verba *id est* usque *usiam* a Magistro inserta sunt. Locus sequens est ibid. c. 6. n. 11.
[2] Cap. 4, n. 9. — Paulo infra post *tria* sola Vat. *dicit* pro *dixit*.
[3] Num. 38. et 39. — Sed textum hunc Magister ex septem locis Hilarii contextuit; quod, ut ipsius methodus exemplo aliquo illustretur, hic lectoris oculis subiicimus. Verba: *Dominus dicit* etc. sunt ex n. 38; *Nam nec solitarium* etc. ibid. paulo ante; *Visus est* etc. ibid. paulo post; *Unum sunt enim natus et generans*, n. 39. *Unum sunt neque unus*, n. 38; *non itaque solitarius Filius est*, n. 39; *nec singularis nec dispar*, n. 38.
[4] Ioan. 14, 9. — Paulo infra post *excluditur* Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 1, omnes codd. et originale *singularitas* pro *singularis*.
[5] Ibid. n. 39, sed ordine propositionum immutato. Pro *sacrilegum* aliqui codd. et edd. 1, 2 habent *sacrilegium*.
[6] Quaestiones, scil. ex veteri et novo Testamento mixtim, quaest. 122. Non sunt Augustini, sed potius auctoris haeretici, fortasse Hilarii diaconi, de quo supra dist. XIX. locuti sumus. In textu Vat. cum originali, sed contra omnes codd. et alias edd., *solitarius* pro *singularis*.
[7] Libr. V. c. 3. n. 46. — Locus sequens est loc. cit. II. c. 1. n. 18. Finito textus, post *ostenditur* omnes codd. et ed. 1 *quod* loco *quia*, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd.
[8] Cap. 8. n. 69. — Sequens textus est ibid. c. 3. n. 33.

[1] Ibid. n. 8; but the words *that is, "the Three Hypostases", "the one Ousia"* [id est tres hypostases, unam usiam] have been inserted by Master (Peter). The following passage is ibid., ch. 6, n. 11.
[2] Chapter 4, n. 9. — A little below this the Vatican edition alone reads *says* [dicit] for *said* [dixit].
[3] Numbers 38 and 39. — But Master (Peter) has woven this text together from seven passages of (St.) Hilary; which, to illustrate his method by an example, we here submit to the eyes of the reader: The first sentence and the second are from n. 38; the third is also from n. 38, a little before it; the fourth likewise, but a little after it; the first half of the fifth from n. 39; the second half from n. 38; the first half of the sixth from n. 39, the second half from n. 38.
[4] Jn. 14:9. — A little below this the Vatican edition and the other editions, contrary to edition 1, to all the codices and to the original, read *there is excluded a singularity and also the understanding of a unique, that is, a solitary* [exluditur singularitas atque unici, id est solitarii intelligentia].
[5] Ibid., n. 39, but with the order of the propositions changed. For *a sacrilege* [sacrilegum] some codices and editions 1 and 2, have *sacrilegious* [sacrilegium].
[6] Mixed Questions from the Old and New Testament, question 122. These do not belong to (St.) Augustine, but rather to a heretical author, perhaps Hilary the Deacon, of whom, we have spoken in Distinction XIX, p. I, ch. 4, p. 337, footnote 8. In the text, the Vatican edition together with the original,

[9] In eodem opere, sed libr. I. c. 2. n. 18. et 19.
[10] Cap. 2. n. 17.

but contrary to all the codices and the other editions, has *solitary* [solitarius] for *singular* [singularis].
[7] Book V, ch. 3, n. 46. — The following passage is loc. cit., Bk. II, ch. 1. n. 18. After the end of the texts, all the codices and edition 1 have *that* [quod] for the *that* [quia], which the Vatican edition and the other editions have.
[8] Chapter 8, n. 69. — The following quote is ibid., ch. 3, n. 33.
[9] In the same work, but Bk. II, ch. 2, nn. 18 and 19.
[10] Chapter 2,n. 17.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

De substantialibus nominibus divnis in speciali.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 404-406.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

On substantial Divine Names in particular.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 404-406.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Praedictis adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina, quae secundum substantiam etc.

To the aforesaid there must be added, that since all the names, which are said of God according to substance etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de diversitate divinorum nominum in generali. Hic incipit secunda pars, in qua agit de eadem[1] in

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the diversity of Divine Names in general. Here he begins the second part, in which he deals

speciali. Et quoniam quaedam nomina sunt substantialia, quaedam relativa, et haec contingit considerare absolute, et ad se invicem:[2] ideo haec pars habet tres partes. In prima agit de nominibus substantialibus. In secunda de relativis, infra distinctione vigesima sexta: *Nunc de proprietatibus personarum, quas frequenter* etc. In tertia de his[3] relativis ad invicem, infra distinctione trigesima tertia: *Post supradicta interius considerari*.

with the same[1] in particular [in speciali]. And since certain names are substantial, certain ones relative, and it happens that one considers them absolutely, and regarding one another:[2] for that reason this part has three parts. In the first he deals with substantial names. In the second with relative ones, below in the Twenty-sixth Distinction (where he says): *Now of the properties of the Persons, which we have frequently* etc. In the third with those[3] relative to one another, below in the Thirty-third Distinction (where he says): *After the above said, it is necessary that there be considered more interiorly* etc..

Et quoniam inter nomina substantialia hoc nomen *persona* excipitur a generali regula, quae est, quod substantiale dicitur de tribus singulariter: ideo nomen istud[4] primo a generali regula excipit, ostendens, quod debemus dicere tres personas; et hoc in praesenti distinctione. Secundo vero determinat quod significetur per hoc nomen *tres* et per hoc nomen *personas*, cum dicimus tres personas, infra distinctione proxima. *Hic diligenter inquiri oportet*.

And since among substantial names, this name *"person"* is excepted from the general rule, which is, that a substantial (name) is said of the Three singularly: for that reason he first excepts that name of Theirs[4] from the general rule, showing, that we ought to say (that there are) Three Persons; and this (he does) in the present distinction. But second, he determines what is signified through this name "Three" and through this name "Persons", when we says (that there are) "Three Persons", below in the next Distinction (where he says): *Here there must be a diligent inquiry* etc..

Prima pars habet quatuor. In prima Magister illud nomen excipit a generali regula. In secunda rationem huius exceptionis investigat, ibi: *Ideo oritur hic questio difficilis*, ostendens, quod fuit inopia humani eloquii. In tertia Magister contra assignationem opponit et determinat, ibi: *Sed quaeritur hic, cum dicamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum*. In quarta epilogat determinata, ut addat, ibi: *Iam sufficienter, ut puto, ostensum est*. Harum partium subdivisiones per se patent. Nam quaelibet pars subdividitur in duas iuxta duo capitalia, quae continet.[5]

The first part has four (parts). In the first Master (Peter) excepts that name from the general rule. In the second he investigates the reason for this exception, there (where he says): *For this reason, there arises here an indeed difficult, but not unuseful, question*, showing, that it was the need of human speech. In the third Master (Peter), opposes and determines (questions) contrary to the assigning (of this name), there (where he says): *But here there is asked, since we say, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are Three Persons* etc.. In the fourth he speaks further of what has been determined [epilogat determinata], to add (them), there (where he says): *It has already been shown sufficiently, I think* etc.. The subdivisions of these parts are clear through themselves. For every part is subdivided into the two chapters, which it contains.[5]

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione de his nominibus *persona*, *substantia* et *essentia*, duo

For an understanding of those (things) which are said in the present distinction of the names "*person*", "*substance*" and

principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de translatione istorum nominum ad divina.
Secundo de numeratione eorundem in divinis.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.
Primo, utrum debuerit ibi[6] transferri nomen *personae*.
Secundo vero, utrum nomen *substantiae*.
Tertio, utrum nomen *essentiae*.

"*essence*", two (things) are principally asked.

First there is the question [quaeritur] concerning the transferal of those names to the divine.
Second (the one) concerning the numbering of the same in the divine.

About the first three (things) are asked.
First, whether the name for 'person' ought to have been transferred there.[6]
But second, whether the name for 'substance' (ought to have been).
Third, whether the name for 'essence' (ought to have been).

ARTICULUS I.

De translatione nominum persona, substantia, esentia ad divina.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum nomen personae convenienter ad divina translatum sit.

Primum ergo quaeritur, utrum debuerit ibi[7] transferri nomen *personae* ad divina. Quod autem nomen personae non debeat dici in divinis, ostenditur sic:

1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate, et habetur in littera:[8] « Dictum est: tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur »: ergo videtur, . . .

ARTICLE I

On the transferal of the names "person", "substance" (and) "essence" to the divine.

QUESTION 1

Whether the name for 'person' has been fittingly transferred to the divine.

First, therefore, there is asked, whether the name for '*person*' ought to have been transferred there,[7] to the divine. But, that the name for 'person' ought not be said among the divine, is shown in this manner:

1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the fifth (book) <u>On the Trinity</u>, and (as) it is had in the text:[8] « There has been said: "Three Persons", not so that that would be said, but lest one would be silent »: therefore it seems, . . .

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[1] In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 minus congrue deest *de eadem*.
[2] Lectio plurimorum codd. et ed. 1, in qua omittitur *invicem*, ambiguitatem generat et est contra subnexa; codd. aa bb, omisso *invicem*, verbis *ad se* praefigunt *per comparationem*.
[3] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *substantialibus et* pro *his*.
[4] Codd. V Y *illud*.
[5] In Vat. desideratur ultima haec propositio *Nam quaelibet* etc., quae tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1.
[6] Vat. *ad divina* loco *debuerit ibi*, sed contra codd., quorum tamen plures cum ed. 1 habent *debuit*.
[7] Licet particula *ibi* superabundare videatur, exigentibus tamen plurimis mss. et ed. 1, eam inseruimus. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur minus congrue *nomen personae*. Dein Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Et quod* loco *Quod autem*.
[8] Hic, c. 1. in fine.

[1] In very many manuscripts and edition 1, there is lacking less congruently *with the same* [de eadem].
[2] The reading of very many codices and edition 1, in which there is read *regarding themselves* [ad se] for *regarding one another* [ad se invicem], generates ambiguity and is contrary to what is subjoined; codices aa and bb, having made this change, reads *through a comparison to themselves* [per comparationem ad se].
[3] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads *with substantial (names) and (names) relative* [de substantialibus et relativis].
[4] Codices V and Y reads *that name* [illud nomen] for *that name of Theirs* [istud nomen].
[5] In the Vatican edition there is wanting this last proposition, *For every part is subdivided* etc. [Nam quaelibet etc.], which, however, is extant in the manuscripts and edition 1.
[6] The Vatican edition reads *whether there is a*

transferring of the name for 'person' to the divine [utrum ad divina transferri nomen personae], but contrary to the codices, many of which, however, together with edition one have the indicative form, instead of the perfect subjunctive, for *ought to have* [debuit]. [Trans. note: Here the single quotation marks about the word *'person'* indicate the concept which is signified with the word *person*, the double quotation marks about "*person*" or the same in Latin underlined, indicate the word *person* itself or the Latin word, respectively, which is used to signify the concept; the word *person* without quotation marks refers to that which is signified by the word and the concept, such as in the phrase, *The Person of God the Father*. Phrases in double quotations are either quotes form authors, or the equivalent verbal proposition to the words just double quoted; phrases in single quotations marks are notional statements, such as is had in the major and minor of a logical argument. The only variation to these rules, is that for '*being*', which refers to the notion of *being* when in Latin it is spoken of using the word *esse*, to distinguish it from the name notion, spoken of using the neuter singular form of the participle *ens*., which will be rendered a/ the *being* in this translation. Cf. the Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms, at the beginning of this English translation.]

[7] Though the particle *there* [ibi] seem to be superfluous, yet as required by very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted it. [Trans. note: It seems that *there* here and just before footnote 6 in the text, signifies *in Master Peter's text* rather than *in God*, and thus is not superfluous. Indeed ignorant of this reason, perhaps, the Vatican edition in footnote 6 changed the reading to remove this apparent superfluity.] Next in very many manuscripts and edition 1, there is omitted less congruously *the name for 'person'* [nomen personae]. Then the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *And that* [Et quod] in place of *But, that* [Quod autem].

[8] Here in ch. 1, at the end.

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quod solum ad fugam haereticorum et non secundum veritatem et proprietatem dicatur *persona* in divinis.

that "*person*" is said among the divine solely to flee heretics and not according to the truth or propriety.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia *persona* nominat particulare et non quodcumque, sed rationalis naturae; sed a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius: ergo cum in divinis non sit dicere *particulare*,[1] similiter nec erit dicere *personam*.

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*, because "*person*" names a particular and not anything whatsoever, but (that) of a rational nature; but from whatsoever a superior is removed, (there is) also (removed) the inferior: therefore since among the divine there is not speaking of a *particular*,[1] similarly neither will there be a speaking of a *person*.

3. Item, particulare rationalis creaturae est compositissimum inter omnia creata. Nam compositum est ex substantia corporali et

3. Likewise, a particular of a rational creature is the most composed among all created (beings). For it has been composed

spirituali, et rursus corporalis inter omnes videtur maiorem compositionem habere: ergo cum *persona* sit nomen particularis, et hoc summe compositi, et in divinis est summa simplicitas, patet quod in divinis non debet[2] dici nomen *personae*.

from a corporal and spiritual substance, and again, among all, the corporal is seen to have more composition: therefore since "*person*" is the name of a particular, and this of one most highly composed, and among the divine there is a most high Simplicity, it is clear that among the divine the name for '*person*' ought[2] not be said.

4. Item, vocabula nostra debent respondere Graecis, ut unitas fidei ostendatur; sed Graeci non utuntur vocabulo *prosopon* in divinis, quod est idem quod *persona*: ergo cum ipsi proprius habeant vocabula quam nos,[3] nec nos debemus uti.

4. Likewise, our vocabulary [vocabula nostra] ought to respond to the Greeks, so that the unity of the Faith be shown; but the Greeks do not use the word "*prosopon*" among the divine, which is the same as "person": therefore since they have a more proper vocabulary than we (do),[3] neither ought we use (it).

Contra: 1. *Persona* dicitur quasi *per se sonans*, sive *per se unum*;[4] sed *per se unum* propriisime recipitur in Deo: ergo et *persona* secundum suum nomen.

On the contrary: 1. A "*person*" is said like one "making a sound through himself" [per se sonans], or "one through itself" [per se unum];[4] but a "one through itself" is most properly received in God: therefore also '*person*' according to its own name.

2. Item, *persona* dicitur habens suam naturam intellectualem ab aliis distinctam; sed in Deo est ponere habentem naturam intellectualem et ab aliis distinctam, sicut supra ostensum est de pluralitate personarum:[5] ergo etc.

2. Likewise, a "*person*" is said (to be) one "having his own intellectual nature distinct from others"; but in God there is a positing of "one having an intellectual nature and (that) distinct from others", just as has been shown above concerning the plurality of the Persons:[5] ergo etc..

3. Item, *persona* nominat mihi ultimum in genere rationalis naturae; sed rationalis sive intellectualis natura est nobilior inter creata,[6] et rursus, ultimum in illa est completissimum, quia ei nulla potest fieri additio: ergo si quidquid completionis est, ponendum est in Deo propriissime, patet etc.

3. Likewise, "*person*" names for me the last the genus of rational nature; but a rational or intellectual nature is more noble among[6] created (beings), and again, the last among them is the most complete, because to it no addition can be made: therefore if whatever belongs to completion, must be posited in God most properly, it is clear etc..

4. Item, *persona* dicit dignitatem. Unde in ecclesiasticis personae dicuntur habentes dignitatem aliquam notabilem:[7] ergo cum dignitas propriissime sit in Deo, nomen *personae* propriissime in Deo ponendum est.

4. Likewise, "*person*" means dignity. Whence among ecclesiastics "persons" are said (to be those) having some notable dignity:[7] therefore since dignity is most properly in God, the name for 'person' most properly is to be posited in God.

CONCLUSIO.

Nomen personae convenienter et proprie in divinis dicitur ad significandam distinctionem et proprietatem nobilissimam suppositorum.

CONCLUSION

The name for 'person' is fittingly and properly said among the divine to signify the distinction and most noble property of the Supposits.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *persona* de sui ratione dicit suppositum[8] distinctum proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente. Et hoc patet in sua *etymologia* et in *aequipollenti*

I respond: It must be said, that "*person*" from its own reckoning means "a supposit[8] distinct by a property pertaining to dignity". And this is clear in its *etymology*

suo.

In *etymologia*, quia persona dicitur quasi *per se unum*.[9] Per se autem unum proprie dicitur unum, quod est omnino distinctum ab aliis et in se indistinctum.[10] *Rursum*, persona dicitur a *personando*, quasi a se resonando; resonare autem dicitur quod in sono praeeminent aliis; et ideo *persona* dicitur suppositum distinctum habens dignitatem, et ratione huius dignitatis, cum deberet per naturam vocabuli dici *persona*, penultima correpta, dicitur persona, penultima producta.[11]

and in its *equipollent* (term).

In *etymology*, because a "person" is said like "one through itself" [per se unum].[9] But a "one through itself" is properly said to be "one, which is entirely distinct from others and indistinct in itself".[10] *Again*, "person" is said from "sounding throughout" [personando], as if from "resounding itself" [se resonando]; but "to resound" is said (to be) that which in sound is preeminent to others; and for that reason a "*person*" is said (to be) "a distinct supposit having a dignity", and by reason of this dignity, since (this) ought to be said through the nature of the word persona with the penultimate syllable said slowly [penultima correpta], a person is meant when the penultimate syllable (has been) drawn out.[11]

Similiter ratio huius significationis accipitur ab *aequipollenti* in lingua Graeca, quod est *prosopon*. Apud Graecos prosopon dicebatur, sicut narrat Boethius, homo larvatus, qui quidem solebat fieri in tragoediis; et fiebat propter duo: una ratio erat ad distincte repraesentandum eum, de quo fiebat . . .

Similarly, the reckoning for this signification is accepted from the *equipollent* (term) in the Greek tongue, which is "*prosopon*". Among the Greeks "*prosopon*" used to mean, just as (St. Severinus) Boethius relates, a "masked man" [homo larvatus], which indeed used to be done in tragedies; and it was done for the sake of two (reasons): one reason was to represent distinctly the one, from whom the discourse / was being made;

[1] Cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. — Mox lectionem, qua ponitur *simpliciter* loco *similiter*, quaeque in mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 communissima est, minus ideoneam iudicamus, nisi verba *simpliciter nec* sumantur pro *omnino nec* seu *nullo modo*.

[2] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *debet* pro *oportet*.

[3] Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice hic repetit verba *et non utuntur*. Paulo ante cod. V post *utuntur* addit *hoc*, et cod. O ponit *per prius* loco *proprius*.

[4] Vat. et recentior cod. cc *una*. Dein ed. 1 post *sed* adiungit *esse per se sive*, dum e contra cod. T breviter *hoc* loco *per se unum* habet.

[5] Dist. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante fide multorum mss. ut F G H I P Q S T V W X etc. et ed. 1 post *intellectualem* adiecimus particulam *et*, quam cod. S etiam eodem modo in maiori propositione exhibet. Dein nonnulli codd. ut T W in minori *distinctum* pro *distinctam*.

[6] Cod. aa praemittit *omnia*. Paulo infra communior mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectio ponit *quod* pro *quidquid*.

[7] In comment. supra Ioannem, c. 1, 23. n. 50. (Supplem. Bonelli, tom. I.) S. Bonav. ait: *Personae* dignae et eminentes personae *ecclesiasticae* vocantur. — Vat. aliaeque edd. in hoc argumento, sicut et infra in corp. quaest., legunt *ecclesiis* pro *ecclesiasticis*; plurimi codd. propter abbreviationem verbi sunt ambiguae lectionis; codd. H ee cum ed. 1

[1] Cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 2. — Next we judge the reading, by which *simply* [simpliciter] is put in place of *similarly* [similiter], which is most common in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, less fitting, unless the words *simply neither* [simpliciter nec] are taken for *entirely neither* [omnino nec] or *in no manner* [nullo modo].

[2] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *ought* [debet] for *it is necessary* [oportet].

[3] The Vatican edition, together with only one or the other codex, repeats here the words *and they do not use (it)* [et non utuntur]. A little before this codex V reads *this* [hoc] for *the* before *word* [vocabulo], and codex O puts *through (a consideration of what is) prior a* [per prius] for *a more proper* [proprius].

[4] The Vatican edition and the more recent codex cc have the feminine form for *one* [una]. Then edition 1 after *but* [sed] adds *a "'being' through itself" or* [esse per se sive], while contrariwise codex T has briefly *this* [hoc] for *a "one through itself"* [per se unum].

[5] Distinction 2, q. 2. — A little before this, trusting in many manuscripts, such as F G H I P Q S T V W X etc., and edition 1, we have inserted after *intellectual* [intellectualem] the particle *and (that)* [et], which codex S also exhibits in the same manner

in corp. quaest. *ecclesiasticis* clare exhibent scriptum, quae lectio et contextu et definitione ex Commentario super Ioan. modo allat et iure canonicao confirmatur.
[8] In multis mss. deest *suppositum*, sed minus congrue; ed. 1 *quid* pro *suppositum*. Mox Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 perperam *pertinens* pro *pertinente*. — Infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. allatis tribus definitionibus personae quartam adiungit S. Doctor his verbis: A magistris definitur sic: persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente.
[9] Ita S. Isidorus, si audias B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1, sed idem in Comment., I. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. hoc Simoni Tornacensi adscribit. — Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *una*, sed minus bene.
[10] Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 11. (IV. c. 6.): Universaliter namque quotcumque non habent divisionem, quatenus non habent, eatenus unum dicuntur. Ex X. text. 9. (IX. c. 3.): Quod vero indivisibile aut non divisum, unum. Libr. III. Phys. text. 68. (c. 7.): Quoniam unum est indivisibile, quodcumque unum sit. — Paulo infra post *quasi* communiorem mss. et ed. 1 lectionem exhibemus substituendo *a se* loco *per se*; forte melius legeretur *a per se*. Dein aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *eminet* loco *praeeminet*.
[11] Haec etymologia nominis *personae* invenitur in Boeth., de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi, c. 3, his verbis: Persona vero dicta est a personando, circumflexa penultima. Quod si acuatur antepenultima, aperte a sono dicta videbitur.
[12] Loc. cit.

in the major proposition. Then not a few codices, such as T and W, in the minor reads *a distinct (being)* [distinctum] for *(that) distinct* [distinctam].
[6] Codex aa adds *all* [omnia]. A little below this the more common reading of the manuscripts and editions, 1, 2, and 3, puts *what* [quod] for *whatever* [quidquid].
[7] In his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John, 1:23, n. 50 (Bonelli's, Supplement, tome I) St. Bonaventure says: *Worthy and eminent, ecclesiastical persons are called "persons"*. — The Vatican edition and some editions in this argument, just as below in the body of the question, read *in the Churches* [in ecclesiis] for *among ecclesiastics* [in ecclesiasticis]; very many codices, on account of the abbreviation have an ambiguous reading; codices H and ee, together with edition 1, in the body of the question clearly exhibit the written form *ecclesiastics* [ecclesiasticis], which reading, both from the context and the definition given in the Commentary on St. John just cited and from the custom of canon law, is confirmed.
[8] In many manuscripts there is read *(something) distinct* [distinctum] for *a supposit distinct* [suppositum distinctum], but less congruently; edition 1 has *something* [quid] for *supposit* [suppositum]. Next the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, faultily reads *(and) pertaining* [pertinens] for *pertaining* [pertinente]. — Below in d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 4, having cited the three definitions of "person", the Seraphic Doctor adds a fourth with these words: By the masters (of sacred theology) it is defined in this manner: a "person" is a "hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility".
[9] Thus St. Isidore, if you accept what Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus says), Summa., p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1, but the same is ascribed here in d. 23, a. 2 to Simon of Tornay. — The Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, reads in the feminine *one* [una], but less well.
[10] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 11 (Bk. IV, ch. 6): For universally however many do not have a division, to the extent that they do not have (it), to that extent are said (to be) one. From Bk. X, text 9 (Bk. IX, ch. 3): However what (is) indivisible or not divided, (is) one. In Physics, Bk. III, text 68 (ch. 7): Since "one" is indivisible, any "one" whatsoever is. — A little below this after *as if* [quasi], we exhibit the more common reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, by substituting *from "resounding itself"* [a se resonando] in place of *"resounding through itself"* [per se resonando]; perhaps it would be better to read *from "resounding through itself"* [a per se resonando]. Then some codices, together with edition 1, have *is eminent* [eminet] in place of *is preeminent* [praeeminet].
[11] This etymology of the name "person" is found in (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, ch. 3, in these words: However, "person" has been said from "sounding throughout" [personando], with the penultimate syllable circumflexed [circumflexa penultima]. Which if the antepenultimate is accented, it will openly seem (to

have been) said from “sound”.

[12] Loc. cit..

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sermo; alia ratio erat ad melius resonandum vel personandum. Et ista duo conveniunt dicits[1] dubabus proprietatibus: et ideo ab hoc nomine *prosopon* apud Graecos tractum est hoc nomen *persona* apud Latinos.

the discourse / was being made; the other reason was to better resound and/or sound throughout. And those two befit the two said[1] properties: and for that reason from this name “*prosopon*” among the Greeks there has been drawn this name persona among the Latins.

Et quia in ecclesiasticis maxime attenditur distinctio dignitatum, tractum est *primo* ad significandum honorem in ecclesiasticis. *Deinde*, quia individuum rationalis naturae distinctum est ab aliis, et hoc proprietate dignitatis inter creaturas, hinc est, quod extensum est ad significandum suppositum rationalis naturae. *Demum*,[2] quia in Deo est reperire suppositum distinctum proprietate nobilissima, Spiritu sancto dicante, translatum est ad divina, quia ibi res nominis propriisime inventiur, quamvis ipsum nomen prius aliis sit impositum. Concedendum est ergo, quod in divinis proprie et convenienter nomen *personae* accipitur.

And because among ecclesiastics a distinction of dignity is attained most of all, it was drawn *first* to signify honor among ecclesiastics. *Then*, because a individual of rational nature is distinct from others, and by this property of dignity among creatures, hence it is, that it has been extended to signify a supposit of rational nature. *Finally*,[2] because in God there a finding of a “supposit distinguished by a most noble property”, with the Holy Spirit having spoken (to the Churches), it has been transferred to the divine, because There is found more properly the subject of the name [res nominis], though the name itself had been imposed upon others before. It must be conceded, therefore, that among the divine the name for ‘*person*’ is properly and fittingly accepted.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *dictum* est, non ut diceretur; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur pro[3] tempore illo, in quo nomen *personae* secundum usum aequivalebat substantiae; et ideo dictum est, non ut diceretur quod persona *consueverat significare*, sed dictum est quasi translatum, *ne taceretur*, id est, ne confessio fidei diminuta esse probaretur.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that it has been *said*, not to be said; it must be said, that (St.) Augustine speaks on behalf of[3] that time, in which the name for ‘*person*’ was equivalent, according to use, to “substance”; and for that reason it was said, not so that what “person” was accustomed to signify would be said, but it has been said like a transferred (name); *lest one remain silent*, that is, lest the confession of the faith be proved to have been diminished.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *persona* nominat particulare; dicendum, quod particulare de ratione sui nomninis importat partem et imperfectionem; sed persona de ratione sui nominis importat completionem; ideo ponitur in divinis, quamvis non particulare; et bene, quia in divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie.[4]

2. To that which is objected, that “*person*” names a particular; it must be said, that ‘particular’ from the reckoning of its name conveys ‘a part’ and ‘an imperfection’; but ‘person’ from the reckoning of its name conveys ‘a completion’; for that reason it is posited among the divine, though “particular” (is) not; and rightly, because among the divine the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly.[4]

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona

3. To that which is objected, that “person”

nominat compositissimum; dicendum, quod hoc accidit, quia individuum rationalis naturae creatae est in genere et ideo multis differentiis distat, cum distinguatur qualitate; sed in divinis est distinctio sola origine, et praeterea[5] non est in genere; et ideo non oportet, quod sit ibi aggregatio differentiarum.

names (something) most composed; it must be said, that this happens [accidit], because an individual of a created, rational nature is in a genus and for that reason is distant (from it) by many differences, since it is distinguished by a quality; but among the divine there is solely distinction by origin, and besides, He[5] is not in a genus; and for that reason it is not necessary, that there be There an aggregation of differences.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud Graecos[6] non utuntur aequipollenti, scilicet *prosopon*; dicendum, quod ratio utendi apud Latinos non tam fuit proprietas quam penuria, quia non habebant quid responderent. Et ratio huius fuit, quia substantia secundum communem usum idem sonat quod essentia; Graeci autem habebant proprium vocabulum, scilicet hypostasis, quo utuntur: et ideo non sunt coacti transferre, ut nos.

4. To that which is objected, that among the Greeks[6] they do not use the equipollent (term), namely "*prosopon*"; it must be said, that the reason for using (it) among the Latins was not so much propriety as penury, because they did not have something to respond with. And the reason for this was, because "substance" according to common use sounds the same as "essence"; but the Greeks had a proper word, namely "hypostasis", which they use: and for that reason they were not constrained to transfer ("prosopon" to the divine), as we (were).

SCHOLION.

I. Conclusio affirmativa probatur per definitionem *personae*. Haec definitio eruitur tum ex etymologia vocabuli Latini, tum ex aequipollenti termino Graeco *prosopon* (□□□□□□□□).

Circa verba in solut. ad 2: « In divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie », cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 4; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4; et quoad *partculare et universale* d. 19. p. II. q. 2.

De conceptu personae cfr. infra d. 25. per totam, et d. 34. a. 1. q. 1.

II. De conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 1, et q. 57. m. 1 — Scot., de hac et seqq.; Report. d. 25. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 29. a. 3. — B. Albert. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1. et 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel., hic q. 1.

SCHOLIUM

I. The affirmative conclusion is proved through the definition of "*person*". This definition is built both from the etymology of the Latin word, and from the equipollent Greek term *prosopon* (□□□□□□□□).

On the words in the solution to n. 2: « among the divine the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly », cf. above d. 8, p II, dubium 4; and Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4; and in regard to *particular and universal*, d. 19, p. II, q. 2.

On the concept of "person", cf. below d. 25, throughout, and d. 34, a. 1, q. 1.

II. On the conclusion: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 56, m. 1, and q. 57, m . 1 — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following questions, Reportatio, d. 25, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 29, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 53, q. 1 and 2. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here in q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel., here in q. 1.

[1] Vat. cum cod. cc *praedictis*.
[2] Ex multis mss. ut F G T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *Demum* pro *Deinde*.
[3] Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *de*.
[4] In codd. aa bb additur: *Propter quod dicit Augustinus, quod Deus sine quantitate est mangus, sine qualitate bonus*; in cod. H vero *nomen speciei, ut bonus et magnus, nomen generis, ut qualis et quantus*, qui et additionem, quam ex codd. aa bb notavimus, in margine exhibet.
[5] Supple: Deus, vel: divina persona. — Pauci codd. ut Z bb ee *propterea* loco *praeterea*, lectio non spernenda; alii pauci ut K V *persona* pro *praeterea*. — De hac responsione vide plura apud Richard. de S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 13-16.
[6] Ita fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. contra Vat., quae legit *Graeci*. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. 1 post *habebant* substituimus *quid* pro *quod*.

[1] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, reads *aforesaid* [praedictis].
[2] From many manuscripts, such as F G T etc., and edition 1, we have substituted *Finally* [Demum] for *Then* [Deinde].
[3] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, but with the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, reads *of* [de] in place of *on behalf of* [pro].
[4] In codices aa and bb there is added: *On account of which (St.) Augustine says, that God is great without quantity, good without quality* [Propter quod dicit Augustinus, quod Deus sine quantitate est mangus, sine qualitate bonus]; in codex H, however, there is added *a name of a species, such as "good" and "great", a name of a genus, such as "what kind" and "how much"*, which exhibit the addition, which we note from codices aa and bb, in the margin.
[5] Supply: "God", and/or "a Divine Person". — A few codices, such as Z bb and ee, have *on this account* [propterea] for *besides* [praeterea], a reading not to be spurned; a few codices, such as K and V, have *a person* [persona] for *besides, He* [praeterea]. — On this response see Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity, Bk. IV, chs. 13-16.
[6] Thus nearly all the codices together with the six first editions, contrary to the Vatican edition, which reads *Greeks* [Graeci] in nominative. A little below this, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted after *they did not have* [non habebant] *something* [quid] for *what* [quod].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

ARTICULUS I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

ARTICLE I

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 406-408.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 406-408.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in divinis nomine substantiae et subsistentiae convenienter utendum sit.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum nomen *substantiae* dici debeat in divinis vel etiam *subsistentiae*. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus libro quinto de Trinitate:[7] « Deus absque ulla dubitatione dicitur substantia, vel si melius appellatur, essentia ».

2. Item, tam Boethius quam Augustinus de Trinitate dicunt, quod aliorum nominum genera, ut . . .

[7] Cap. 2. n. 3.
[8] Libr. de Trin. c. 4; et August., V. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11. seq. — Mox aliqui codd. ut V X *transeant* pro *transeunt*. Dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 bis posuimus *transit* loco *transeat*. Codd. Y aa post *nomen* satis bene addunt *ibi*.

QUESTION 2

Whether among the divine the name for 'substance' and 'subsistence' is fittingly to be used.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the name for '*substance*' ought to be said among the divine and/or even (that) for '*subsistence*'. And it seems, that (it is) so.

1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the fifth (book) On the Trinity:[7] « God, without any doubt, is said (to be) a "substance", and/or if He be better named, an "essence" ».

2. Likewise, (St. Severinus) Boethius[8] as much as (St.) Augustine say of the Trinity, that the genera of the other names, such as . . .

[7] Chapter 2, n. 3.
[8] In his book, On the Trinity, ch. 4; and Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. V, ch. 10, n. 11 ff. — Next some codices, such as V and X, read *pass over* [transeant] in the subjunctive. Then trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have twice placed the indicative *pass over* [transit] for the subjunctive. Codices Y and aa read sufficiently well *there the name* [nomen ibi].

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magnitudo, bonitas etc., transeunt in substantiam: si ergo substantia non *transit* in aliud, constat substantiae nomen proprie dici; nam si non proprie, aeque bene diceretur, quod substantia transit in alia, sicut e converso.

"greatness", "goodness" etc., pass over into the Substance: if, therefore, "substance" *does* not *passover* into another, it is established that the name for 'substance' is properly said; for if (it is) not properly (said), equally well would there be said, that "substance" passes over into other (names), just as (they do) the other way around.

3. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Philosophum[1] est quod est *ens per se*; sed solus Deus propriissime est *ens per se*: ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo.

3. Likewise, the reckoning of a substance according to the Philosopher[1] is "that which is a *being through itself* [ens per se]"; but God alone is most properly a *being through Himself*; therefore the name for 'substance' is most properly in God.

4. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Augustinum[2] est dici *ad se* et absolute; sed ibi est proprie dici ad se, ubi nulla est dependentia: ergo si hoc est in Deo, ergo

4. Likewise, the reckoning of a substance according to (St.) Augustine[2] is "a being said *regarding itself* and absolutely"; but there is properly a "being said regarding

etc.

itself", where there is no dependence; therefore if this is in God, ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate:[3] « Inconveniens est dicere de Deo, quod substet bonitati suae »; sed si de bonitate, eadem ratione et de qualibet proporietate: ergo, simpliciter loquendo, inconveniens est dicere, ipsum esse substantiam.

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Augustine in the seventh (book) On the Trinity (says):[3] « It is unfitting to say of God, that He stands beneath [substet] His own goodness »; but if (this be said) of (His) goodness, by the same reckoning also of any property: therefore, simply speaking, it is unfitting to say, that He is a substance.

2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate:[4] « Deus non est substantia, sed supra omnem substantiam »; ergo hoc nomen *substantia* proprie est in creaturis et non in Deo.

2. Likewise, (St. Severinus) Boethius in the book On the Trinity (says):[4] « God is not a substance, but above every substance »; therefore the name "*substance*" is properly in creatures and not in God.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: quia[5] omne quod substat, habet aliquid inhaerens; sed in Deo non est inhaerens neque inhaerentia: ergo nec substantia.

3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*: because[5] everything which stands beneath [substat], has something inhering (to it); but in God there is no inherent nor inherence; therefore neither substance.

4. Item, omen quod substat alii,[6] componitur illi; ergo ubi non est compositio nec nomen compositionis, ibi nec nomen substantiae: ergo cum in divinis non sit compositio, patet etc.

4. Likewise, everything which stands beneath another,[6] is composed with it: therefore, where there is no composition, nor a name for 'composition', there (is) neither the name for 'substance': therefore since among the divine there is no composition, it is clear etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Substantia, quatenus dicit stare per se, non per aliud, proprie dicitur in divinis; quatenus dicit substare accidenti inhaerenti, non admittitur; quatenus dicit substare sive alii distinguenti sive alii perficienti, recipitur, sed magis propter imperfectionem nostri intellectus quam secundum proprietatem divini esse.

CONCLUSION

"Substance", to the extent that it means "to stand through itself, not through another", is properly said among the divine; to the extent that it means "to stand beneath an inherent accident", it is not admitted; to the extend that it means "to stand beneath either another distinguishing or another perfecting" it is received, but more on account of the imperfection of our intellect than according to a property of the Divine 'Being'.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen substantiae a duplici proprietate potest dici, videlicet a *per se stando*, non per aliud; et[7] sic proprie est in divinis, et magis etiam proprie quam in creaturis; vel a *substando alii* vel aliis, et hoc est[8] tripliciter: vel alii *inhaerenti*, et sic falso et improprie dicitur in divinis, quia proprietates in divinis non sunt accidentes nec inhaerentes; vel alii *distinguenti*, et sic dicitur in divinis non omnino improprie nec omnino proprie, quia proprietas illa non inhaeret, sed distinguit,[9] et ideo non facit subsistere sive substare,

I respond: It must be said, that the name for 'substance' can be said from twofold property, namely, from "*standing through itself*" [per se stando], not through another; and[7] in this manner it is among the divine, and even more properly than among creatures; and/or from "*standing beneath another*" [substando alii] and/or others, and this is[8] in a threefold manner: either "(standing beneath) another *inhering* (in it)", and in this manner it is falsely and improperly said among the divine, because properties among the divine are not

quasi *sub alio stare*, sed existere, quasi *ab alio esse* — et hinc est, quod Richardus dicit in libro de Trinitate,[10] quod « melius dicitur existentia quam substantia » — vel quia substat alii ut *perficienti*, et sic dicitur *res naturae* substare respectu essentiae. Et iste modus magis est circa nostrum intelligere quam circa divinum esse, quia,[11] sicut patebit in sequenti problemate, ex nostro intellectu evenit talis modus dicendi, non ex proprietate divini esse.

accidents nor inherent; and/or "(standing beneath) another *distinguishing*", and in this manner it is said not entirely improperly nor entirely properly among the divine, because that property does not inhere, but it does distinguish,[9] and for that reason it does not cause it to subsist or stand beneath, as if *standing under another*, but to exist, as if *to be from another* — and hence it is, that Richard (of St. Victor) days in the book On the Trinity,[10] that « it is better said (to be) an "existence" than a "substance" » — and/or because it stands beneath another as *one perfecting*, and in this manner *a thing of the nature* [res naturae] is said to stand beneath in respect of (its) essence. And that manner is more about our understanding than about the Divine 'Being', because,[11] just as will be clear in the following problem, such a manner of speaking comes forth form our intellect, not from the property of the Divine 'Being'.

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[1] Aristot. substantiam communiter *negative* definit, ut in libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: « Neque de subiecto aliquo dicitur, neque in subiecto aliquod est »; et V. Metaph. text. 15. (IV. c. 8.): « Ultimum subiectum, quod non dicitur de alio »; *positive* autem libr. I. Phys. text. 27. seq. (c. 3), ubi ipsam vocat: « illud quod vere est »; et VII. Metaph. text. 4. (VI. c. 1.): « simpliciter ens ». Ex his verbis vel etiam ad oppositionem accidentis, quod secundum Aristot. V. Metaph. text. 35. (IV. c. 30.) alteri inest, seu cuius esse est alteri inesse, haec vulgaris definitio substantiae formata esse videtur, quae occurrit et in Ioan. Damasc. Dialectica c. 4, et in Averrois Comment. VII. Metaph. text. 48: Substantiae, quia sunt existentes per se. — In fine argumenti ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus propositionem *ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo*, quae in Vat. et cod. recentiore cc perperam deest. Paulo ante auctoritate plurimum mss. ut H L M N O Y Z post *propriissime est* adiecimus *ens*.

[2] Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9: « Absurdum est autem, ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit: quanto magis Deus »? Et ibidem c. 5. n. 10: « Utrumque (essentia et substantia) ad se dicitur, non relative ad aliquid ». — Mox codd. W Y *sed* loco *ergo si*, et codd. V X *differentia* pro *dependentia*.

[3] Cap. 5. n. 10: Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat et subsit Deus bonitate suae.

[4] Cap. 4: Nam substantia in illo non est vere substantia, sed ultra substantiam.

[5] Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *quia*. Paulo infra post *non est* in nonnullis mss. ut B S W Y aa additur *aliquid*.

[6] Vat. contra auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1 minus distincte *aliquid* pro *alii*.

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[1] Aristotle commonly defines "substance" *negatively*, as in his book On Predicaments, ch. "On Substance": « Nor is it said of any subject, nor is it in any subject »; and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 15 (Bk. IV, ch. 8): « The last subject, which is not said of another »; but *positively* in Physics, Bk. I, text 27 ff (ch. 3), where he calls it: « that which truly is » [illud quod vere est]; and in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 4 (Bk. VI, ch. 1): « a being simply » [simpliciter ens]. From these words and/or even those (said) in opposition to "accident", which according to Aristotle, Metaphysics, text 35 (Bk. IV, ch. 30) "is in another" [aliteri inest], or "the being of which is to be in another", this popular definition of "substance" seems to have been formed, which occurs in (St.) John Damascene, Dialectics, ch. 4, and in Averoes, Commentary Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 48: Substances, because they are existing through themselves [Substantiae, quia sunt existents per se]. — At the end of the argument, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied the proposition *therefore the name for ' substance' is most properly in God* [ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo], which in the Vatican edition and the more recent codex cc is faultily lacking. A little before this, on the authority of very many manuscripts, such as H L M N O Y and Z, we have inserted after *is a* [est] *being* [ens].

[2] On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 4, n. 9: « But it is absurd, that "substance" is said relatively: for every thing subsists according to itself: how much more (then does) God »? And ibid., ch. 5, n. 10: « Each (i.e. "essence" and "substance") is said regarding itself, not relatively to something ». — Next codices W and Y read *but* [sed] in place of *therefore if* [ergo si], and codices V and X have *difference* [differentia]

[7] Codd. inter se non conveniunt; maior pars eorum cum ed. 1 exhibet *et*, pro quo aliqui ut A T V X *sed*, aliqui cum Vat. *si*. Mox post *magis* in multis mss. ut A F G I T V X Y Z etc. et ed. 1 adiungitur *etiam*, quod Vat. omittit.
[8] Aliqui codd. ut A T W cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*. Dein post *inhaerenti* cod. O addit *et haec est propria acceptio substantiae*.
[9] Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33. q. 2. — In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *sed distinguit*, quae tamen verba extant in aliis codd. et ed. 1. Mox verbis *ab alio esse* cod. O praemittit *sub alio sistere id est*, ubi et multi codd. ut A C F I K R S T U X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *quia* pro *quasi*.
[10] Libr. IV. c. 20: « Personae rectius dicuntur existentiae, quam substantiae vel subsistentiae ». — Ex quibus ultimis verbis Vat. pro textu selegit *subsistentia*, dum codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibent *substantia*. Mox ex codd. W bb (ee a secunda manu) claritatis gratia adiecimus *alii* post *substat*.
[11] Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *et* pro *quia*. In fine responsionis codd. X Z *divinae essentiae* loco *divini esse*.

for *dependence* [dependentia].
[3] Chapter 5, n. 10: It is forbidden, however, to say, that God subsists and stands under His own goodness.
[4] Chapter 4: For the ‘substance’ in Him is not truly a substance, but beyond substance.
[5] The Vatican edition together with codex cc omits *because* [quia]. A little below this in not a few manuscripts, such as B X W Y and aa there is read *there is nothing inherent* [non est aliquid inhaerens].
[6] The Vatican edition, contrary to the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, has less distinctly *something* [aliquid] for *another* [alii].
[7] The codices do not agree among themselves; the greater part of them, together with edition 1, exhibit *and* [et], in place of which some, such as A T V and X have *but* [sed], some with the Vatican edition have *if* [si]. Next after the following *and* [et] in many manuscripts, such as A F G I T V X Y Z etc., and edition 1, where is added *even* [etaim], which the Vatican edition omits.
[8] Some codices, such as A T and W, together with edition 1, omit *is* [et]. Then after *inhering (in it)* [inhaerens] codex O adds *and this is the proper acceptance of “substance”* [et haec est propria acceptation substantiae].
[9] See more on this below in d. 33, q. 2. — In the Vatican edition and codex cc, there is wanting *but it does distinguish* [sed distinguit], which words, however, are extant in the other codices and edition 1. Next codex O prefaces to the words *to be from another* [ab alio esse] the words *to stand still beneath another, that is* [sub alio sistere id est], where also many codices, such as A C F I K R S T U X Y, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, read *because* [quia] for *as if* [quasi].
[10] Book IV, ch. 20: « Persons are more rightly said (to be) “existences”, than “substances” and/or “subsistences” ». — From which last words the Vatican edition selects “subsistence” for the text, while the codices together with the six first editions exhibit “*substance*”. Next from codices W and bb (ee by a second hand) for the sake of clarity we have added *another* [alii] after *it stands beneath* [substat].
[11] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, with all the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, reads *and* [et] for *because* [quia]. At the end of the response codices X and Z have *of the Divine Essence* [divinae essentiae] in place of *of the Divine ‘Being’* [divini esse].

SCHOLION.

I. Secundum duplicem proprietatem, quae in substantia potest attendi, scilicet *stare per se* et *substare* (cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 5. 6.), datur etiam responsio duplex ad quaestionem. Secundum primam proprietatem substantia recte transfertur ad divina; substantia in secundo sensu sive *substare aliis* iterum tripliciter potest

SCHOLIUM

I. According to the twofold property, which can be attended to in a substance, namely *to stand through itself* and *to stand beneath* (cf. above d. 8, p. II, dubia 5 and 6), there is also given to the question a twofold response. According to the first property “substance” is rightly transferred to the divine; “substance” in the second sense or

intelligi, cui distinctioni respondet triplex responsio.

as one *standing beneath another* can, again, be understood in a threefold manner, to which distinction there corresponds a threefold response.

II. Quoad sententiam Richardi a S. Victore, quod in divinis melius dicatur *existentia* quam *subsistentia*, observandum est, quod ipse intelligit *subsistens* in sensu stricto pro eo quod per se distinctum est ea proprietate, quae in ipso est ut *in subiecto*; *existens* vero pro eo quod per se est distinctum ex modo *originis*. « Sed alii doctores S. Scripturae subsistentias large accipiunt pro qualitercumque per se existentibus hypostasibus, et ideo personas divinas subsistentias vel substantias vocant ». Ita B. Albert., hic a. 1. ad 2; cfr. etiam S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 3. ad. 4.

II. In regard to the sentence of Richard of St. Victor, that among the divine there is better said "*existence*" than *"subsistence*", it must be observed, that he understands a "*subsistent*" in the strict sense for "that which has been distinguished through itself by that property, which is in it as *in a subject*", "*existent*", however, for "that which has been distinguished through itself out of the manner of an *origin*". « But other doctors of Sacred Scripture accepts "subsistences" broadly for "hypostases existing through themselves in any manner whatsoever", and for that reason they call the Divine Persons "subsistences" and/or "substances" ». Thus Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1, in reply to n. 2; cf. also St. Thomas , Summa., I, q. 29, a. 3, in reply to n. 4.

III. Terminus *res naturae*, hic in corp. et alibi saepe occurrens, sumtus est ex S. Hilario (de Trinit. IX. n. 3.) et significat *suppositum*. Cfr. infra d. 34. q. 1. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 2. in corp. dicit: « Substantia dicitur *res naturae*, secundum quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae ».

III. The term "*a thing of the nature*" [res naturae], occurring here in the body of the question, and elsewhere frequently, has been taken from St. Hilary (On he Trinity, Bk. IX, n. 3) and signifies a *supposit*. Cf. below d. 34, q. 1. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 29, a. 2, in the body of the question, says: « A substance is said (to be) *a thing of the nature*, according to which it supposes for some common nature, just as this man is a thing of the human nature ».

IV. In conclusionibus omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 1, et q. 57. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 43. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., q. 2. collater. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. n. 51. seqq., a. 68. q. 5. n. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2.

IV. In the conclusion all agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 1, and q. 57, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1 and 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albert us (Magnus), on this and the following question, here in a. 4; Summa., p. I, tr. 10, q. 43, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following question, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, q. 2, collaterals 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 32, q. 5, n. 51 ff.; a. 68, q. 5, n. 4. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1 and 2.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 408-411.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

ARTICLE I

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 406-411.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum nomen essentiae in divinis convenienter adhibeatur; insuper quaeritur de differentia nominum essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum nomen *essentiae* dici debeat in divinis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate:[1] « Essentia vere ac proprie dicitur in divinis, ita ut forte solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam ».

2. Item, hoc nomen *qui est* est nomen, quod ipse Deus sibi imposuit;[2] ergo si ipse proprie se nominat, Deus proprie dicitur *qui est*; sed de quocumque proprie dicitur *qui est*, proprie potest dici in ipso[3] *essentia*: ergo et in divinis dicitur essentia.

3. Item, inter omnia nomina nomen *essentiae* est absolutissimum, unde

QUESTION 3

Whether the name for ' essence' is fittingly employed among the divine; moreover, there is asked concerning the difference of the names "essence", "subsistence", "substance" and "person".

Third there is asked, whether the name for '*essence*' ought to be said among the divine. And it seems that (it is) so.

1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the seventh (book) On the Trinity:[1] « "Essence" is truly and properly said among the divine, such that perhaps it is opportune [oporteat] that God alone be said (to be) an "essence" ».

2. Likewise, this name "*He who is*" is the name, which God Himself imposed upon Himself;[2] therefore if He names Himself properly, God is properly said (to be) "*He who is*", but of whomsoever there is properly said "*He who is*", there properly can be said (that) in him[3] (there is) an *essence*: therefore "essence" is said among the divine.

3. Likewise, among all names, the name for '*essence*' is the most absolute, whence an

essentia secundum Avicennam[4] dicitur rei quidditas nomine aboluto; cum ergo in divinis sit omnimoda absolutio: ergo et nomen *essentiae*.

"essence" according to Avicenna[4] is said (to be) "the quiddity of the thing according to an absolute name"; since, therefore, among the divine there is an omnimodal absolution: therefore (there is) also the name for '*essence*'.

Contra: 1. Non intelligimus Deum nisi in creaturis et per creaturas; sed nominatio Dei est per[5] nostrum intelligere: ergo nullum nomen absolutum omnino debet poni in Deo.

On the contrary: 1. We do not understand God except in creatures and through creatures; but the naming of God is through[5] our understanding: therefore no entirely absolute name ought to be posited in God.

2. Item, quaero, in quo differant nomen *substantiae* et[6] *essentiae*? Nam substantia aut dicit *commune*, aut *suppositum*. Si *suppositum*: ergo superfluit nomen personae; si *commune*: ergo superfluit . . .

2. Likewise, I ask, in what do the name for 'substance' and[6] for 'essence' differ? For "substance" either means (something) *common*, or a *supposit*. If a *supposit*: therefore the name for 'person' is superfluous; if (something) *common*: therefore the name for '*essence*' / is superfluous: . . .

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[1] Cap. 5. n. 10; in quo textu fide plurium mss. ut G H Y ee et ed. 1 nec non originalis post *oportet* expunximus *per*.
[2] Exod. 3, 14.
[3] Vat. *de ipso*. Paulo ante post *qui est* a nonnullis mss. ut A S T V X Y et ed. 1 omittitur *proprie*. Circa finem argumenti post *dicitur* in cod. M repetitur bene *proprie*.
[4] Prae manibus habemus principaliora tantum Avicennae opera (ed. Venet. sine anno), scil. Logicam, librum Sufficientiae, de Caelo et Mundo, de Anima, de Animalibus, de Intelligentiis et Primam philosophiam (metaphysicam). Licet sententia, quam S. Bonav. hic refert, in ceteris etiam Avicennae operibus quoad verbum non inveniretur, sicut in praedictis opusculis verbotenus non occurrit, colligi tamen ipsa posse videtur ex doctrina Avicenna de universalibus. Secundum ipsum enim essentiae rerum sub triplici respectu considerari possunt. « Unus respectus essentiae est, secundum quod ipsa est *non relata* ad aliquid tertium esse nec ad id quod sequitur eam, secundum quod ipsa est sic. Alius respectus est, secundum quod est in his singularibus; et alius, secundum quod est in intellectu » (Log. p. I. c. 1.). Essentiae in se consideratae, seu quatenus essentia est, Avicenna vindicat esse absolutissimum i. e. tale quod excludit quemlibet respectum. Sic in Prima philosophia, tract. 5. c. 1. agendo de esse universalium ait: « Ponamus ergo in hoc duas considerationes (de essentia humanitatis), unam considerationem de ipsa, secundum quod est ipsa, et aliam considerationem de consequentibus ipsam. Secundum autem primam considerationem non est nisi humanitas tantum; unde si quis interrogaverit, an humanitas, quae est in Platone, ex hoc quod est humanitas, sit alia ab illa, quae est in Socrate, et necessario dixerimus: non, non oportebit consentire ei, ut dicatur: ergo haec et illa sunt una numero; quoniam negatio illa absoluta

[1] Chapter 5, n. 10; in which text, trusting in very many manuscripts, such as G H U and ee, and edition 1, not without the original, we have expunged before *an "essence"* [essentiam] *through* [per].
[2] Ex. 3:14.
[3] The Vatican edition has *of him (that he is)* [de ipso] for *(that) in him (there is)* [in ipso]. A little before this after *"He who is"* [qui est] thre is omitted by not a few manuscripts, such as A S T V X and Y, and edition 1, *properly* [proprie].
[4] We have made a review of only the more principle works of Avicenna (Venetian Edition, undated), namely, Logic, Book on Sufficiency, On Heaven and the World, On the Soul, On Animals, On Intelligences and The First Philosophy (Metaphysics). Though the sentence, which St. Bonaventure cites here, is not literally found in all the other works of Avicenna, just as it does not occur in the aforesaid works word-for-word, yet it seems that it can be gathered from the doctrine of Avicenna concerning universals. For according to him the essences of things can be considered under a threefold respect. « One respect of an essence is, according to which it is *not related* to any third "being" nor to that which follows it, according to which it is thus. The other respect is, according to which it is among these singulars; and the other, according to which it is in the intellect » (Logic, p. I, ch. 1). « Avicenna defends that an essence considered in itself, or to the extent that it is an essence, is most absolute, i. e. such that it excludes any respect. Thus in The First Philosophy, tract 5, ch. 1, when dealing with the "being" of universals, he says: « We, therefore, posit two considerations (concerning the essence of "humanity") in this (one man), one consideration concerning it, according to which it is, and the other consideration concerning the what is consequent to it. But according to the first consideration, it is naught but only a humanity; whence if anyone will

fuit, et intelleximus in ea, quod illa humanitas, ex hoc quod est humanitas, est humanitas tantum . . . Dicemus ergo, quod hoc est quiddam sensibile, quod est animal vel homo cum materia et accidentibus, et hoc est homo naturalis; et hoc est quiddam, quod est animal vel homo consideratum in se ipso secundum hoc quod est ipsum, non accepto cum eo hoc quod est sibi admixtum, sine conditione communis aut proprii aut unius aut multi, nec in effectu nec in respectu etiam potentiae, secundum quod est aliquid in potentia; animal enim ex hoc quod est animal, et homo ex hoc quod est homo, scil. quantum ad definitionem suam et intellectum suum absque consideratione omnium aliorum, quae comitantur illum, non est nisi animal vel homo » etc. Cfr. S. Thomas, de Ente et essentia. — In conclusione argumenti fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *et*.

[5] Ita melius mss. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 dum Vat. cum ed. 1 habet *propter*. Paulo ante in aliquibus mss. ut A S T etc. deest *et per creaturas*, sed minus bene et contra responsionem ad hoc obiectum infra positam.

[6] Vat. hic repetit *nomen*.

ask, whether the humanity, which is in Plato, out of this that it is a humanity, be other than that (humanity), which is in Socrates, and we necessarily will say: "No, one is not bound to consent to that, so as to say: 'therefore this one and that one are one in number'"; since that negation was absolute, and we understood in that, that that humanity, out of this that it is a humanity, is only a humanity . . . We will say, therefore, that this (one man) is a certain sensible, which is an animal and/or a man with matter and accidents, and this is a natural man; and this is a certain (man), which is an animal and/or a man considered in itself according to that which it itself is, not accepted with that "this" which is mixed with itself, without the condition of "common" or "proper" or "one" or "many", not in an effect nor in a respect even to (its) potency, according to which it is something in potency; for an animal from this that it is an animal, and a man out of this that he is a man, namely, as much as regards his own definition and his own understanding without the consideration of all others, which accompany him, is naught but an animal and/or a man » etc. Cf. St. Thomas, On Being and Essence. — In the conclusion of this argument, trusting in the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted *also* [et].

[5] Thus the better reading of the manuscripts together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, while the Vatican edition, together with edition 1 has *on account of* [propter]. A little before this in some manuscripts, such as A S T etc., there is lacking *and through creatures* [et per creaturas], but less well and contrary to the response to this objection, posited below.

[6] The Vatican edition here repeats *the name* [nomen].

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nomen *essentiae*: ergo cum debeamus labia nostra circumcidere in loquendo de Deo, nequaquam debet hoc nomen poni in Deo.[1]

3. Item, quaeritur gratia huius de necessitate et sufficientia et differentia istorum quatuor nominum: essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona.

the name for '*essence*' / is superfluous: therefore since we ought to circumscribe our lips in speaking of God, by no means ought this name be posited in God.[1]

3. Likewise, there is asked on this account concerning the necessity and sufficiency and difference of those four names: "essence", "subsistence", "substance" and "person".

CONCLUSIO.

Nomen essentiae convenienter adhibetur in divinis; ratio et sufficientia quatuor nominum explicantur.

CONCLUSION

The name for an essence is fittingly employed among the divine; the reason and sufficiency of the four names is explained.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ista quatuor nomina sive vocabula[2] respondent quatuor vocabulis in Graeco, quae sunt: usia, usiosis, hypostasis et prosopon, ut usia respondeat essentiae, usiosis substantaie,

I respond: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that those four names or words [vocabula][2] respond to the four words in Greek, which are: "ousia", "ousiosis", "hypostasis", and "prosopon", such that "ousia" corresponds to "essence",

hypostasis subsistentiae et prosopon personae.

“ousiosis” to “substance”, “hypostasis” to “subsistence”, and “prosopon” to “person”.

Ratio autem et sufficientia horum[3] quatuor nominum ab aliquibus accipitur sic. In divinis est accipere *communicabile* et *incommunicabile*, et hoc ex veritate et necessitate fidei, quae dicit Deum trinum et unum.

But the reason and sufficiency for these[3] four names is accepted from other important reasons [ab aliquibus] in this manner. Among the divine there is an accepting of the *communicable* and the *incommunicable*, and this out of the truth and necessity of the Faith, which says that God (is) Triune and One.

Et cum nos[4] debeamus intelligere in Deo, quod vere est, per id quod videmus in his inferioribus, maxime secundum nobiles et primas et praecipuas conditiones; cum in *communi* in inferioribus inveniatur *quod est* et *quo est*,[5] ratione cuius significatur in concretione et in abstractione, ut dicatur *homo* et *humanitas*: sic in divnis *intelligimus*, quamvis non intelligamus in differentia illa duo. Ideo et in abstractione *significamus*[6] per hoc nomen *deitas*, et in concretione per hoc nomen *Deus*. Et ideo imposuimus ei nomen, quo significaretur ipsum *quo est*, et hoc est essentia; et ipsum *quod est*, et hoc est substantia; et ita haec duo nomina accipiuntur ex parte *communis*.

And since we[4] ought to understand in God, what truly is, through that which we see among these inferiors, most of all according to (their) noble and first and chief conditions, since there is found in *common* among inferiors *what it is* and *whereby it is*,[5] by the reckoning of which it is signified in concretion and in abstraction, so that there be said “*man*” and “*humanity*”: in the same manner among the divine *do we understand*, since we do not understand the two in that difference. For that reason also in abstraction *we signify* (Him)[6] through this name “*Deity*”, and in concretion through this name “*God*”. And for that reason we have imposed upon Him the name, by which there is signified that *whereby He is*, and this is “essence”; and that *which He is*, and this “substance”; and thus those two names are accepted on the part of (what is) *common*.

Est etiam in divinis accipere, quod est *incommunicabile*, et hoc est quid distinctum, sive quis distinctus. Et hoc quidem contingit dupliciter intelligi sive significari: vel in quantum *distinguibile*, et hoc per nomen *subsistentiae* sive hypostasis; vel in quantum *distinctum*, et hoc per nomen *personae*. Et licet in Deo nihil differant distinguibile et distinctum, quia potentia in eo semper actui est coniuncta, tamen contingit duplici nomine significari.[7]

And among the divine there is also an accepting of what is *incommunicable*, and this is what (is) distinct, or Who (is) distinct. And this indeed happens to be understood or signified in a twofold manner: either inasmuch as (it is) *distinguishable*, and this through the name for ‘subsistence’ or ‘hypostasis’; and/or inasmuch as (it has been) distinguished, and this through the name for ‘person’. And though in God the distinguishable and the distinct differ in nothing, because in Him potency is always conjoined to act, yet it does happen that they are signified[7] with a twofold name.

Unde differunt ista quatuor nomina secundum modum intelligendi, sicut *quo est*, *quod est*, *qui est*, *quis est*.[8] Et quoniam in Deo idem est *quo est* et *quod est* ex una parte, et *distinguibile* et *distinctum* ex alia secundum rem, Sancti accipiunt et *substantiam* et *essentiam* pro eodem; similiter et *hypostasis* nomine utuntur Graeci pro *supposito* actu distincto. Unde

Wherefore those four names differ according to (their) manner of being understood, just as *whereby it is*, *what it is*, *which it is*, *who it is* (do).[8] And since in God the same is *whereby He is* and *what He is* on one part, and the *distinguishable* and the *distinguished* on the other according to the thing, the Saints accept both “*substance*” and “*essence*” for the same (thing);

distinctio per *quo* et *quod est*, et per *distinguibile* et *distinctum* in nominibus[9] divinis non facit diversitatem nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.

Fuerunt etiam[10] alii volentes dicere, quod *substantia* et *essentia* accipiuntur ex parte *communis*, sed differenter, quia illud *commune* contingit intelligi sub duplici ratione: una est, quod omnia indigent[11] eo, ut sint; alia est, quod ipsum non eget aliis. Primo modo dicitur *essentia*, a qua et per quam omnia sunt; secundo modo *substantia*, quoniam per se stat, omnibus[12] aliis circumscriptis. *Subsistentia* vero sive hypostasis et persona accipiuntur ex parte *incommunicabilis* et differunt. Quamvis enim utrumque nomen dicat quid distinctum, tamen *hypostasis* dicit suppositum substantiae distinctum, sed *persona* dicit distinctum proprietate nobili.

Fuerunt[13] alii, qui voluerunt dicere, quod ista quatuor nomina distinguuntur per *communicabile* et *incommunicabile*, secundum quod potest unumquodque dupliciter significari: vel in *abstractione*, vel in *concretione*. Nam *communicabile* potest significari[14] in *abstractione*, et sic dicitur essentia; vel in *concretione* ad suppositum, et sic dicitur substantia. Similiter *incommunicabilis* potest significari in *abstractione*, et sic dicitur subsistentia sive hypostasis; vel in *concretione*, et sic dicitur persona.

similarly the Greeks also use the name "*hypostasis*" for a "*supposit* distinguished by an act". Whence the distinction through *where by (it is)* and *what it is*, and through *the distinguishable* and *the distinguished* does not cause among Divine Names[9] a diversity, except according to the reckoning of understanding.

There were also[10] others wanting to say, that "*substance*" and "*essence*" are accepted on the part of (what is) *common*, but differently, because that *common* happens to be understood under a twofold reckoning: one is, "what all lack[11] for this, that they be"; the other is, "that which does not need others". In the first manner there is said "*essence*", from that and through that which all are; in the second manner "*substance*", since it stands through itself, with all[12] others excluded. However, "*subsistence*" or "hypostasis" and "person" are accepted on the part of the *incommunicable* and they do differ. For though each name means something distinct, yet "*hypostasis*" means a "distinct supposit of a *substance*", but "*person*" means a "(supposit) distinct by a noble property".

There were[13] others, who wanted to say, that those four names are distinguished through the *communicable* and the *incommunicable*, according to which each one can be signified in a twofold manner: either in *abstraction*, and/or in *concretion*. For the *communicable* can be signified[14] in *abstraction*, and in this manner it is said (to be) an "essence"; and/or in *concretion* to a supposit, and in this manner it is said (to be) a "substance". Similarly the *incommunicable* can be signified in *abstraction*, and in this manner it is said (to be) a "subsistence" or "hypostasis"; and/or in *concretion*, and in this manner it is said (to be) a "person".

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[1] Cod. X ultima haec verba activo modo: *nequaquam debemus hoc nomen ponere in Deo*.
[2] In multis mss. ut A F G H I K T V W X Y et ed. 1 omittitur *nomina sive*, in cod. S autem *sive vocabula*.
[3] Aliqui codd. cum Vat. *istorum*, sed mox Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 minus distincte *aliquando* pro *ab aliquibus*.
[4] Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *nos*. Mox, plurimis codd. et ed. 1 exigentibus, substituimus *id* pro *illud*, ac dein ex fere omnibus mss. mutavimus *notabiles* in *nobiles*.

[1] Codex X has these last words in the active mood: *by no means ought we posit this name in God* [nequaquam debemus hoc nomen ponere in Deo].
[2] In many manuscripts, such as A F G H I K T V W X and Y, and edition 1, there is omitted *names or* [nomina sive], but in codex S there is omitted *or words* [sive vocabula].
[3] Some codices together with the Vatican edition have *these four names of ours* [istorum quatuor nominum], but next the Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient manuscriptsa and edition one, has

[5] Fide plurimum mss. ut H I K W X ee et ed. 1 adiunximus *est*, ut et communiter haec duo exhibentur. Paulo infra cod. H *cum differentia* loco *in differentia*.
[6] Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. *significatur*, et paulo infra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *significaremus* pro *significaretur*, ubi codd. L O *quod significaret* loco *quo significaretur*. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 post *imposuimus* deest *ei*.
[7] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *significare*, sed minus cohaerenter cum praecedentibus. Ed. 1 insuper *ratione* pro *nomine*.
[8] Fide maioris partis codd. et ed. 1 omisimus ter particulam *et*, qua Vat. dictiones *quo est, quod est* etc. coniungit; pauci codd. exhibent particulam *et* bis tantum, nempe inter primas duas dictiones ac inter duas ultimas.
[9] Vat. cum aliquibus mss. minus distincte *omnibus* pro *nominibus*.
[10] Nonnulli codd. ut A Z cum ed. 1 *et* pro *etiam*.
[11] Ed. 1 *egent*.
[12] Vat. minus bene et contra antiquiores mss. cum ed. 1 omittit *omnibus*. Plures codd. ut F H I P Q T Z aa et ed. 1 *per se est* loco *per se stat*, et aliqui codd. ut V W X post *secundo modo* repetunt *dicitur*. Paulo infra cod. L *distinguuntur* pro *differunt*.
[13] Cod. Z cum ed. 1 hic addit *et*, ac mox codd. A S T Y cum ed. 1 *secundum* loc *per*.
[14] Lectionem Vat. castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *significari* pro *significare*. Dein post *concretione* plures codd. ut A C O R S T W Y non male omittunt *ad suppositum*.

less distinctly *sometimes* [aliquando] for *from other important reasons* [ab aliquibus].
[4] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, breaking with the other codices and edition 1, omits the explicit subject *we* [nos]. Next, as required by very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted *that* [id] for *that* [illud], and then from nearly all the manuscripts, we have changed *notable* [notabiles] into *noble* [nobiles].
[5] Trusting in very many manuscripts, such as H I K W X and ee, and edition 1, we have inserted *it is* [est], as these two are commonly exhibited. A little below this codex H has *with that difference* [cum differentia illa] for *in that difference* [in differentia illa].
[6] The Vatican edition, together with only a few codices, reads *He is signified* [significaretur], and a little below this, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, it has *we signify* [significaremus] for *there is signified* [significaretur], where codices L and O read *what signifies* [quod significaret] in place of *by which there is signified* [quo significaretur]. In very many manuscripts and edition 1, after *we have imposed* [imposuimus] there is lacking *upon Him* [ei].
[7] Very many codices together with edition 1 have *one signifies (them)* [significare] for *they are signified* [significari], but less coherently with the preceding. Edition 1, moreover, has *reckoning* [ratione] for *name* [nomine].
[8] Trusting in the greater part of the codices and edition 1, we have omitted three times the particle *and* [et], with which the Vatican edition conjoins the sayings *where by it is*, *what it is* etc.; a few codices exhibit the particle *and* [et] only twice, namely between the first two sayings and between the last two.
[9] The Vatican edition, together with some manuscripts, reads less distinctly *all Divine (Names)* [omnibus divinis] for *Divine Names* [nominibus divinis].
[10] Not a few codices, such as A and Z, together with edition 1, have *also* [et] for *also* [etiam].
[11] Edition 1 has *need* [egent].
[12] The Vatican edition, less well and contrary to the more ancient manuscripts, together with edition 1, omits *all* [omnibus]. Very many codices, such as F H I P Q T Z and aa, and edition 1 have *it is through itself* [per se est] in place of *it stands through itself* [per se stat], and some codices, such as V W X after *in the second manner* [secundo modo] repeat *there is said* [dicitur]. A little below this codex L has *they are distinguished* [distinguuntur] for *they do differ* [differunt].
[13] Codex Z together with edition 1 here adds *also* [et], and next codices A S T and Y, together with edition 1, have *according to* [secundum] for *through* [per].
[14] We have corrected the reading of the Vatican edition from the manuscripts and edition 1, by putting *be signified* [significari] for *signify* [significare]. Then after *concretion* [concretione], very many codices, such as A C O R S T W and Y, do not badly omit *to a supposit* [ad suppositum].

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Sed tamen omnes isti modi habent calumniam. *Primus* quidem, qui sumitur per distinguibile et distinctum, quia Graeci utuntur vocabulo hypostasis, ubi nos utimur persona, et ita pro supposito distincto. Et Damascenus[1] dicit, quod « hypostasis est substantia cum proprietatibus »; et ita significat actu distinctum. *Secundus* modus simliter habet calumniam, quia essentia non videtur aliquo modo significari ut in ratione causae respectu aliorum, cum sit nomen absolutissimum. *Tertius* modus habet calumniam similiter,[2] quia substantia significat in abstractione, sicut essentia; et *praeterea* dubium est, utrum sit intelligere hypostases, abstractis proprietatibus; et ideo si non est intelligere, quomodo contingit significare?

However all these manners have been calumniated [habent calumnia]. The *first* indeed, which is taken through the distinguishable and the distinguished, because the Greeks use the word "hypostasis", where we use "person", and thus for a distinct supposit. And (St. John) Damascene[1] says, that « a "hypostasis" is a "substance with properties" »; and thus he signifies "one distinguished by an act". The *second* manner similarly has been calumniated, because "essence" does not seem to be signified in a manner other (than) as in the reckoning of "a cause in respect to others", since it is a most absolute name. The *third* manner has been calumniated similarly[2], because "substance" signifies in abstraction, just as "essence" (does), and *moreover* there is a doubt, whether there is an understanding of hypostases, abstracted from properties; and for that reason if there is not an understanding, in what manner does it happen that they signify?

Et propterea *quartus* modus dicendi est, quod cum fides dicat, Deum esse trinum et unum, in quantum dicit *unum*, non possumus intelligere unum, quin intelligamus *quod est*[3] et *quo est* unum; et *quo est* unum est illud *quod est*, et *quid est* unum est illud *quod est*. Primum est essentia, secundum substantia. Si intelligimus *trinum*, necesse est, quod[4] intelligamus eum *qui* distinguitur, et *quid* distinguitur. *Quo* disinguitur est proprietas; ille autem *qui* disintguitur semper significatur ut distinctus. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel ut distinctus proprietate *quacumque*, vel ut distinctus proprietate *nobili* sive notabili.[5] Primum significatur nomine *subsistentiae*, quae dicitur prima substantia,[6] et convenit non tantum individuo hominis, sed etiam asini. Secundum significatur per hoc nomen *persona*, quod importat nobilem proprietatem et non convenit nisi supposito rationalis creaturae.[7] Quia Graeci utun nomine *hypostasis*, sicut nos nomine *personae*, ideo dicit Boethius,[8] quod Graeci utuntur nomine hypostasis pro supposito rationalis naturae. His visis patent obiecta.

And on this account there is a *fourth* manner of speaking, that says with the Faith, that God is Triune and One, inasmuch as it says "*One*", we cannot understand "one", if we do not understand *what it is*[3] and *whereby it is* one; and *whereby it is* one is that *which it is*, and *what is* one is that *which it is*. The first is the Essence, the second the Substance. If we understand "*Triune*", it is necessary, that[4] we understand Him *who* is distinguished, and *what* is distinguished. *Whereby* He is distinguished is a property; but that One *who* is distinguished is always signified as One distinct. And this can be in a twofold manner: either as One distinct by *whatsoever* property, and/or as One distinct by a *noble* or notable property.[5] The first is signified by the name for '*subsistence'*, which is said (to be) the first substance,[6] and it convenes not only with the individual man, but even with the donkey. The second is signified through this name "*person*", which conveys a noble property and convenes with naught but a supposit of a rational creature.[7] Because the Greeks use the name for '*hypostasis'*, just as we (do) the name for '*person*i, for that reason (St. Severinus) Boethius[8] says, that the Greeks

use the name "hypostasis" for a supposit of a rational nature. With these things seen, the objections are clear.

1. Quod autem[9] obiicitur, quod non debemus Deum nominare *absolute*; dicendum, quod quamvis nominemus Deum per creaturas, tamen etiam per creaturas cognoscimus, eum habere esse absolutum. Alia patent.

1. Moreover,[9] because it is objected, that we ought not name God *absolutely*; it must be said, that although we do name God through creatures, yet we also cognize through creatures, that He has an absolute "being". The other (objections) are (thus) clear.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro faciliore intelligentia aliquorum terminorum, in hac et sequentibus distinctionibus saepe occurentium, haec ex communi antiquiorum doctrina notamus.

1. *Essentia*, *substantia*, *natura*, licet in Deo sint omnino idem et etiam respectu creaturarum ab auctoribus saepe confundantur, tamen in rigore significationis differunt. *Essentia* « sumitur ab esse, quod est communissimum » (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 4.), et simul maxime abstractum et « absolutissimum » (S. Bonav. hic in fundam.) i. e. quod omnem dependentiam et respectum ad extra maxime excludit, et est « maxime intimum cuilibet » (S. Thom., S. I. q. 8. a. 1.). Essentia est proprie id « quod significatur per definitionem » (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 2. ad 3.). Unde dici potest de rebus omnium praedicamentorum. — *Substantia* est magis contractae significationis, cum de eo tantum dicatur, quod est in primo praedicamento, et distinguitur contra *accidens*, quia est illud quod est per se et alterum sustinet. — *Natura* significationem habet adhuc magis contractam. Dicit S. Bonav. (III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.): « In hoc differt essentia a natura, quod essentia nominat rei formam in quadam abstractione, natura eam nominat entem in motu et materia, ut naturalium operationum principium ».

SCHOLIUM

I. For an easier understanding of some of the terms, occurring in this and the following distinctions, we note these things from the common doctrine of the ancients.

1. *Essence*, *substance*, *nature*, though in God they are the same (Thing) and are also often confounded in respect to creatures by (many) authors, yet in strict signification they do differ. "*Essence*" « is taken from esse ["to be", "being"], which is the most common » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 29, a. 3.1, in reply to n. 4, and simultaneously most of all abstract and « most absolute » (St. Bonaventure, here in the 3rd fundament.), i.e., that which excludes every dependence and respect ad extra, and is « most of all most interior to each » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 8. a. 1). An essence is properly that « which is signified through the definition » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 29, a. 2, in reply to n. 3). Whence it can be said of the definitions [res] of every predicament. — "*Substance*" belongs to a more contracted signification, since it is said only of that, which is in the first predicament, and is distinguished against "*accident*", because it is that which is through itself and sustains the other. — "*Nature*" has a signification still more contracted. St. Bonaventure says (Sent., Bk. III, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to n. 4): « In this does "essence" differ from "nature", that "essence" names the form of a thing in a certain abstraction, "nature" names that being in motion and matter, as the principle of natural operations ».

2. *Communicabilis* et *incommunicabilis* duplex est. Alia est communicabilis *per identitatem*, qua aliquod superius suis inferioribus ita est communicabile, ut de ipsis in recto praedicetur. Ita *homo* est communicabile omnibus humanis individuis. Alia est communicabilis per

2. The *communicable* and *incommunicable* is twofold. One is the *communicable through identity*, by which something superior is thus communicable to its inferiors, such that it is predicated of them in a right manner. Thus "*man*" is communicable to every human individual.

informationem sive « per unius constitutionem », qua aliquid ita communicatur, ut sit alicuius rei forma vel substantialis vel accidentalis, sicut anima communicatur corpori, et quodlibet accidens suo subiecto; cfr. III. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Utroque modo essentia divina a nobis concipitur communicabilis et communicata personis, scil. ut *quo est* et ut *quod est*. Nam essentia divina praedicatur in recto de personis (Pater est essentia divina), et concipitur a nobis etiam ut ratio, qua ipsae personae sunt Deus (Pater essentia divina est Deus).

The other is the communicable through *being informed* or « through being constituted as one », by which something is thus communicated, such that it belongs to another thing by either a substantial and/or accidental form, just as a soul is communicated to a body, and any accident to its subject; cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 1. — In each manner the Divine Essence is conceived by us (as) communicable and communicated to the Persons, that is, as *that whereby It is* and as *that which It is*. For "the Divine Essence" is predicated in a right manner of the Persons (e.g. 'the Father is the Divine Essence'), and is conceived by us also as the reckoning, by which the Persons Themselves are God (e. g. 'the Father according to the Divine Essence is God').

3. Differunt *particulare* et *singulare*, *individuum*, *suppositum*, *persona*. *Particulare* potest etiam species dici respectu generis, sed *singulare* seu individuum semper opponitur speciei. Duplex autem est *singulare*: vel in genere *accidentis*, et hoc est communicabile subiecto ut forma accidentalis; vel in genere *substantiae*, et sic singulare vel individuum est *naturaliter* incommunicabile utroque modo supra dicto. De ratione individui est, quod sit divisum ab aliis, quae sunt vel possunt esse in eadem specie, in se indivisum existens. Unde *de facto* individuum in genere substantiae (si praescindimus ab humana Christi natura) coincidit cum *supposito*, de cuius ratione est inommunicabilitas; secundum *conceptum* vero ambo distinguuntur. Quomodo vero suppositum et subsistentia distinguantur a natura singulari, sive quid eidem addant tum in creatis tum in divinis, est quaestio difficilis et controvera, de qua vide infra d. 25. Schol. ad q. 1, et quoad suppositum in divinis d. 34. q. 1. — Denique *persona* iterum magis contrahit significationem *suppositi*; nam *suppositum* etiam in rebus materialibus reperitur, *persona* vero addit nobilitatem naturae intellectualis et eo ipso altiorem gradum in se subsistendi. Minus . . .

3. The *particular* and *singular*, the *individual*, a *supposit* and a *person* differ. The "*particular*" can also be said in respect to a genus; but the "*singular*" or "individual" is always opposed to the "species". However the "singular" is twofold: either in the genus of *accident*, and this is communicable to the subject as an accidental form; and/or in the genus of *substance*, and in this manner the singular and/or individual is *naturally* incommunicable in each of the above said manners. It is from the reckoning of the individual, that it has been divided from the others, which are and/or can be in the same species, (and that it is as) one existing undivided in itself. whence de facto an individual in the genus of substance (if we prescind from the Human Nature of Christ) coincides with a *supposit*, from the reckoning of which there is incommunicability; according to *concept*, however, both are distinguished. However in what manner a supposit and the subsistence are distinguished in a singular nature, or what they add to the same both among created things and among the divine, is a difficult and controverted question, concerning which see below, d. 25, Scholium on q. 1, and in regard to a supposit in the divine, d. 34, q. 1. — Next "*person*" again contracts further the signification of "*supposit*"; for a *supposit* is also found among material things; but a *person* adds (to it) the nobility of an

intellectual nature and for that very reason a higher grade of subsisting in itself. For . . .

[1] Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6: Hypostasis enim definitur essentia cum accidentibus.
[2] Auctoritate plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 hic supplevimus *similiter*, et mox substituimus *significat* for *significatur*. Paulo infra post *non est intelligere* cod. aa repetit *hypostases abstractis proprietatibus*.
[3] In cod. T hic additur *unum*.
[4] Ed. 1 *ut*.
[5] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit *sive notabili*.
[6] Plura de *prima substantia* seu individua substantia videsis in Aristot., libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.
[7] Ed. 1 *naturae*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A T Z cum ed. 1 *notabilem* pro *nobilem*.
[8] Libr. de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi, c. 3. — Vat. in principio huius propositionis contra mss. et sex primas edd. *Pro qua* loco *Quia*, ac dein praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 *ut dicit Boethius, quis ait* pro *ideo dicit Boethius*, nec non paulo post *creaturae* pro *naturae*.
[9] Codd. V X *enim*. Cod. V in fine post *Alia* repetit *obiecta*.

[1] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. III, ch. 6: For a "hypostasis" is defined (as) "an essence with its accidents".
[2] On the authority of very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have here supplied *similarly* [similiter], and next we have substituted *signifies* [significat] for *is signified* [significatur]. A little below this after *there is not an understanding* [non est intelligere] codex aa repeats *of hypostases, abstracted from properties* [hypostases abstractis proprietatibus].
[3] In codex T there is added here *one* [unum].
[4] Edition 1 reads *that* [ut].
[5] The Vatican edition, not trusting the manuscripts and edition 1, omits *or notable* [sive notabili].
[6] See more on *the first substance* or the individual substance in Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Substance".
[7] Edition 1 has *nature* [naturae]. A little before this, very many codices, such as A T and Z, together with edition 1, have *notable* [notabilem] for *noble* [nobilem].
[8] On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, ch. 3. — The Vatican edition at the beginning of this proposition, contrary to the manuscripts and six first editions, has *On behalf of which* [Pro qua] for *Because* [Quia], and then, not trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, it reads *as (St. Severinus) Boethius says, who says* [ut dicit Boethius, quis ait] for *for that reason (St. Severinus) Boethius says* [ideo dicit Boethius], and also a little after this, has *creature* [creaturae] for *nature* [naturae].
[9] Codices V and X read *for* [enim]. Codex V at the end after *The other* [Alia] repeats *objections* [obiecta].

enim res materialies in se subsistunt quam spirituales, per se loquendo. Unde naturae intellectivae dicuntur et sunt eminenti modo *formae subsistentes*. De persona cfr. infra d. 25. per totam.

material things subsist less in themselves than spiritual ones do, speaking per se. Whence intellective natures are said (to be) and are in a more eminent manner *subsistent forms*. On the person, cf. below d. 25, throughout.

II. Circa differentiam et sufficientiam quatuor nominum, de quibus agitur in corp. tres afferuntur opiniones, quae omnes ab eodem fundamento procedunt, scilicet ab illa distinctione inter *communicabile* (commune) et *incommunicabile* (proprium); sed in ulteriore explicatione vias aliquatenus diversas tenent, ut exponitur in textu. Omnes tres opiniones S. Doctor reputat ex aliqua parte deficientes (« habent calumniam »). Contra primam opinionem ipse urget hanc rationem, quod

II. About the difference and sufficiency of the four names, with which he deals in the body of the question, three opinions are cited, which all proceed from the same fundament, namely, from that distinction between the *communicable* (the common) and *the incommunicable* (the proper); ut they are explained further in slightly diverse ways, as is expounded in the text. The Seraphic Doctor considers all three opinions deficient in some manner (« they have been calumniated »). Against the first

theologi cum S. Ioan. Damasceno hypostasim et personam eodem sensu accipiunt; contra secundam, quod abutatur nomine *essentiae* et faciat *referre* ad creaturas, cum sit « absolutissimum », quae ratio confirmatur a S. Thom., (S. I. q. 59. a. 2. in corp.); contra tertiam duas affet rationes, quarum prima habet aliquam difficultatem. Videtur enim S. Doctor negare, quod substantia accipi possit in concreto, quod tamen alibi (a. 2. q. 2) cum S. Thoma clare docet dicendo, personam posse nominare substantiam. Fortasse solum usum loquendi pro argumento adduxit; unde etiam statim aliam addidit rationem. — Denique propriam suam opinionem egregie explanat, consentientibus Alexandro et S. Thoma.

opinion he himself urges this reason, that theologians together with St. John Damascene accept "hypostasis" and "person" in the same sense; against the second, that the name "*essence*" is being abused and that it causes it *to refer* to creatures, though it is « most absolute »; which reckoning is confirmed by St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 59, a. 2 in the body of the question); against the third he brings forward two reasons, the first of which has some difficulty. For the Seraphic Doctor seems to deny, that "substance" can be accepted in the concrete, though elsewhere (in a. 2, q. 2) he clearly teaches with St. Thomas, saying, that "person" can name a substance. Perhaps he brought forward only a usage of speech on behalf of the argument; whence he also immediately added anothe reason. — Next he egregiously explains his own opinion, with Alexander (of Hales) and St. Thomas agreeing.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 1; q. 57. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. q. 29. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic. q. 2. collater. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 5; n. 4. a. 53. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 49, m. 1; q. 57, m. 1 and 2. — St . Thomas, here in a. 1; Summa., I, q. 29, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 3. — Giles the Roman, here in. q. 2, collateral 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 68, q. 5; n. 4. a. 53, q. 4. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.
ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 411-413.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII
ARTICLE II

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 411-413.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

De numeratione quatuor nominum.

Consequenter secundo loco[1] est quaestio de numeratione nominum praedictorum; et supposito quod numeretur hoc nomen *persona*, quaeritur circa hoc:

Primo utrum in divinis numeretur hoc nomen *substantia*.
Secundo quaeritur, si numeretur *essentia*.
Tertio, si hoc nomen *Deus*, utrum scilicet catholice possimus dicere plures deos.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum plures substantiae in divinis dici possint.

Quod **autem** numeretur hoc nomen *substantia*, ostenditur sic.

1. Hilarius de Synodis:[2] « Sunt quidem tria per substantiam, sed unum per consonantiam ».

2. Item, Anselmus in fine Monologii:[3] « Aptius tres dicuntur substantiae ».

3. Item, Boethius in libro de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi:[4] « Dicimus unam essentiam et tres substantias ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia substantia est medium inter esentiam et personam; sed medium sapit naturam extremorum:[5] ergo pari ratione, qua dicitur una substantia ab unitate esentiae, poterit dici *plures* a pluralitate personarum.

ARTICLE II

On the numbering of the four Names.

Consequently in the second place[1] is the question concerning the numbering of the aforesaid Names; and having supposed that this name "*person*" is numbered, there is asked about this:

First whether among the divine this name "*substance*" is numbered.
Second there is asked, if "*essence*" is numbered.
Third, if this name "*God*" (is numbered), whether, that is, we can say in a Catholic manner that there are "many Gods".

QUESTION 1

Whether among the divine there can be said (to be) many "substances".

Moreover, that this name "*substance*" is numbered, is shown in this manner:

1. (St.) Hilary (says) On Synods:[2] « They are, indeed, Three through substance, but One through consonance ».

2. Likewise, (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury says) at the end of the Monologion:[3] « The Three are more aptly said (to be) "substances" ».

3. Likewise, (St. Severinus) Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ (says):[4] « We say that (there is) one Essence and three Substances ».

4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*, because the substance is the means between the essence and the person; but a means tastes [sapit] the nature of the extremes:[5] therefore for the equal reason, by which there is said (to be) "one Substance" from the unity of the Essence, there can be said (to be) "*many*" [plures]

from the plurality of the Persons.

5. Item, omnis numerus ad substantiam reducitur originaliter — nunquam enim accidentia vel proprietatis numerantur nisi per substantiam[6] — actus numerantur et pluraliter dicuntur in divinis: ergo necesse est ponere numerum secundum substantiam. Quod autem pluraliter dicantur, patet; dicitur enim: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus creant.

5. Likewise, every number is reduced to a substance as to its origin [originaliter] — for accidents and/or properties are never numbered except through substance[6] — acts are numbered and are said in the plural [pluraliter] among the divine: therefore it is necessary to posit a number according to substance. But that ("substances") are said in the plural, is clear; for there is said, 'the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit create'.

6. Item, *idem* est relativum substantiae, sicut *talis et qualis* qualitatis; sed haec est falsa: Pater est idem cum Filio, quia dicit Hilarius,[7] quod non possumus dicere Deum eundem: ergo necesse est, quod cadat distinctio in substantia; ergo si propter distinctionem personarum dicimus plures personas, ergo et plures substantias.

6. Likewise, "*the same*" is relative to substance, just as "*such and what kind of*" (is) to quality; but this is false: 'the Father is the same with the Son', because (St.) Hilary[7] says, that we cannot say that God (the Father is) the same: therefore it is necessary, that a distinction occur in the substance; therefore if on account of the distinction of the Persons we say (that there are) many Persons, therefore also many substances.

Contra: 1. Nihil magis dicitur secundum substantiam quam hoc nomen *substantia*: ergo si nomina substantialia dicuntur singulariter de omnibus, sicut patet ex regula Augustini supra posita,[8] patet etc.

On the contrary: 1. Nothing is said more according to substance than this name "*substance*": therefore if substantial names are said singularly of All (the Persons), just as is clear from the rule of (St.) Augustine posited above,[8] it is clear etc..

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[1] Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *secundo loco*, et paulo infra ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 *circa hoc: Primo*.
[2] Num. 31: Sin iquidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum.
[3] Cap. 78: « Nam haec duo nomina (persona scil. et substantia) aptius eliguntur ad significandum pluralitatem in summa essentia ». Et paulo post: « Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiliter illa summa et una trinitas sive trina unitas dici una essentia et tres personae sive tres substantiae ».
[4] Cap. 3: Unde etiam dicimus, unam esse □□□□□□ vel □□□□□□□□, id est essentiam vel subsistentiam Deitatis, sed tres □□□□□□□□□□, id est tres substantias.
[5] Aristot., IV. Polit. c. 9. (c. 7.): In eo (medio) enim utrumque extremorum apparet.
[6] Cfr. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.), ubi agitur de diversis modis, quibus *idem* dicitur, inter quos est ille, secundum quem accidens facit unum numero cum suo subiecto, respectu cuius in libro Auctoritatum Aristotelis etc. additur: unde accidentia numerantur numeratione subiectorum. — Ed. 1 post *proprietates numerantur* addit *in se*.
[7] Libr. I. de Trin. n. 17: Sed nos edocti divinitus neque duos deos praedicare neque solum, hanc evangelici ac prophetici praeconii rationem in confessione Dei Patris et Dei Filii afferemus, ut unum

[1] From the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied: *in the second place* [loco secundo], and a little below this, from the more ancient codices and edition 1, *About this: First* [circa hoc: Primo].
[2] Number 31: They are, indeed, through substance Three, but, through consonance One.
[3] Chapter 78: « For these two Names (i.e. "person" and "substance") are more aptly chosen to signify the plurality in the most high Essence ». And a little after this: « Therefore, by this reason of necessity, that Most High and One Trinity or Triune Unity can be said (to be) one Essence and Three Persons or Three Substances ».
[4] Chapter 3: Whence we also say, that there is one □□□□□□ and/or □□□□□□□□, that is Essence and/or Subsistence of the Deity, but Three □□□□□□□□□□, that is Three Substances.
[5] Aristotle, Politics, Bk. IV, ch. 9, (ch. 7): For in this (medium) each of the extremes appears.
[6] Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5), where he deals with the diverse manners, by which "*the same*" is said, among which is that, according to which an accident is [facit] one in number with its subject, in respect of which in the book On the Authorities of Aristotle., there is added: whence accidents are numbered by the numbering of the subjects. — Edition 1 after *properties are never numbered* [proprietates numerantur] adds *in themselves* [in

in fide nostra sint uterque, non unus; neque eundem utrumque, neque inter verum ac falsum aliud confitentes. Cfr. supra pag. 364, nota 11.
[8] Dist. 22. dub. 2. circa finem.

se].
[7] On the Trinity, Bk. I, n. 17: But we, having been divinely instructed, to preach neither "two gods" nor "a lone (God)", will cite this reason of the Evangelical and Prophetic pronouncement in the confession of God the Father and God the Son, that in our Faith They each are the One (Divine Being), not the One (Person); nor Each the Same (Person), nor confessing Another between the True and the false. Cf. above d. 19, p. II, a. sole, q. 4, p. 364, foonote 11.
[8] Distinction 22, dubium 2, near the end.

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2. Item, inter quaecumque cadit distinctio secundum substantiam,[1] cadit vera diversitas; sed inter Patrem et Filium non est confitenda diversitas, ergo nec numberus secundum substantiam: ergo non est dicere plures substantias.

2. Likewise, among whatsoever there occurs a distinction according to substance,[1] there occurs a true diversity; but between the Father and the Son a "diversity" is not to be confessed, therefore neither a "number" according to substance: therefore there is no saying of many substances.

3. Item, Augustinus[2] dicit: « quod idem est Deo *subsistere* et *esse* »; ergo cum unum sit *esse*, unum est *subsistere*: ergo sicut ab uno *esse* dicitur una *essentia* vel e converso, ita et ab uno *subsistere* debet dici una *substantia* sive *subsistentia*.

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine[2] says: « that it is the same for God *to subsist* and *to be* »; therefore since one is the "*to be*" [esse], one is the "*to subsist*": therefore just as from the one *"to be*" there is said "one *Essence*" and/or the other way around, so also from the one "*to subsist*" there ought to be said "one *substance* or *subsistence*".

4. Item, Hieronymus ad Damasum Papam:[3] « Quis unquam nisi ore sacrilego tres substantias praedicaverit »?

4. Likewise, (St.) Jerome (says) to Pope Damasus: « Who ever, except with a sacrilegious mouth, preached that (there were) Three Substances »?

CONCLUSIO.

Substantia te subsistentia, ut dicunt essentiam, non plurificantur; si accipiuntur in sensu hypostaseos, in plurali dicuntur.

CONCLUSION

"Substance" and "subsistence", as they mean "essence" are not plurified; if they are accepted in the sense of "hypostases", they are said in the plural.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tam *substantiae* quam *subsistentiae* nomen dupliciter accipitur in divinis, quia quodlibet istorum habet in se intellectum *actus* et *praepositionis*. Potest ergo dici *substantia*, quasi *per se stans*, vel[4] *sub alio* sive sub proprietate. *Primo* modo una tantum est sive non numeratur, quia unum est ibi *quod est*. *Alio* modo, prout dicit respectum ad proprietatem,[5] numeratur sive plurificatur. Primo modo tantum valet quantum *usiosis*, secundo modo tantum valet quantum *hypostasis*. Omnino eodem modo distinguitur hoc nomen *subsistentia*,[6] et secundum alterum intellectum aequipollet *usiosi*, secundum alterum *hypostasi*; et

I respond: It must be said, that the name for '*substance*' as much as for a '*subsistence*' is accepted in a twofold manner among the divine, because each of these has in itself an understanding of the *act* and of the *preposition*. Therefore a "*substance*" can be said (to be) a "quasi *standing through itself*" [per se stans], and/or[4] a "*(standing) under another*" [sub alio] or under a property. In the *first* manner there is only one (Substance) or it is not numbered, because There the "*what It is*" is one. In *another* manner, insofar as it means a looking-back to a property,[5] it is numbered or plurified. In the first manner it is worth [valet] only as much as "*ousiosis*",

secundum alterum plurificatur, secundum alterum vero minime.

in the second manner it is worth only as much as "*hypostasis*". In entirely the same manner this name "*subsistence*"[6] is distinguished, and according to the first [alterum] understanding it is equipollent to "*ousiosis*", according to the second "*hypostasis*"; and according to the first it is plurified, but according to the second least of all [minime].

Et quia substantia dicitur dupliciter et subsistentia, ideo venit diversitas modi loquendi inter doctores. Nam Tullius et ipse Boethius[7] dicunt, quod *subsistentia* aequipollet *usiosi*, et ideo dicit Boethius, eam non plurificari; sed *substantiam* dicunt aequipollere *hypostasi*, et ideo dicit Boethius, eam plurificari, et secundum hunc modum loquitur Hilarius, Anselmus et Boethius. Sed Hieronymus et Augustinus volunt, quod *substantia* aequipolleat *usiosi*, et ideo dicunt eam non plurificari, sed[8] *subsistentia hypostasi*, et ideo dicunt eam plurificari. Ex his patet responsio ad utramque partem.

And because "substance" and "subsistence" can be said in a twofold manner, for that reason there comes (about) a diversity of manner of speaking among the Doctors. For (Marcus) Tullius (Cicero) and (St. Severinus) Boethius[7] say, that "*subsistence*" is equipollent to "*ousiosis*", and for that reason (St. Severinus) Boethius says, that it is not plurified; but they say that "*substance*" is equipollent to "*hypostasis*", and for that reason (St. Severinus) Boethius says, that it is plurified, and according to this manner do (Sts.) Hilary, Anselm and Boethius speak. But (Sts.) Jerome and Augustine want, that "*substance*" be equipollent to "*ousiosis*", and for that reason they say that it is not plurified, but[8] "*subsistence*" to "*hypostasis*", and for that reason they say that it is plurified. From these (considerations) the response to each part is clear.

Patet etiam, quare Graeci non transtulerunt nomen *prosopon*, sicut Latini, quia oportuit nos transferre nomen *personae* propter ambiguitatem; et ideo maluit Ecclesia[9] respondere *tres personas* quam *tres substantias* sive *subsistentias*.

It is also clear, why the Greeks did not transfer the name "*prosopon*" (to the divine), just as the Latins (did); because it was necessary for us to transfer the name for *person* on account of the ambiguity (of our two terms "substance" and "subsistence"); and for that reason the Church[9] preferred to respond that (there are) "*Three Persons*" rather than "*Three Substances* or *Subsistences*".

Tamen ad argumentum quod facit, quod substantia tenet medium; dicendum, quod substantia, prout aequipollet[10] hypostasi, plus se tenet cum persona, et ideo numeratur, sicut persona, sive plurificatur: prout autem aequipollet usiosi, plus se tenet cum essentia, et ideo nec numeratur nec plurificatur, sicut nec essentia. Omnes autem illae rationes et[11] praecedentes et sequentes loquutur de substantia, prout aequipollet hypostasi sive supposito, et hoc modo plurificatur.

However to the argument which it makes, that substance holds a medium: it must be said, that "substance", insofar as it is equipollent to[10] "hypostasis", holds itself more with "person", and for that reason is numbered or plurified, just as "person" (is): but insofar as it is equipollent to "ousiosis", it holds itself more with "essence", and for that reason is neither numbered nor plurified, just as neither (is) "essence". Moreover, all those reasons, both[11] preceding and following (that one) speak of "substance", insofar as it is equipollent to "hypostasis" or "supposit", and in this

Rationes autem ad oppositam partem currunt secundum aliam acceptionem huius nomins *substantia*. Simliter iudicandum[12] de hoc nomine *subsistentia*. Sed quoniam auctoritas Augustinis et mos utentium nomen illud, *substantia* scilicet, accipit magis in illa acceptione, in qua dicit ipsum *quod est* sive usiosim sive ipsum commune: ideo communiter non recipitur, ut dicantur *tres substantias* in divinis.

manner it is plurified.

Moreover, the reasons for the opposite side run according to the other acceptation of this name "*substance*". Similarly must it be judged[12] concerning this name "*subsistence*". But since the authority of (St.) Augustine, and the custom of those using (it), accepts that name, that is, "substance", more in that acceptation, in which it means that *which it is* or "ousiosis" or that (which is) "common": for that reason it is not commonly received, that there be said (to be) "*Three Substances*" among the divine.

SCHOLION.

I. Cum termini *substantia* et *subsistentia* compositi sint ex praepositione *sub* et verbo *stare* sive *sistere*, duplicem sensum ex etymologia habere possunt, sive ut dicit S. Bonav. (hic in corp.), habent « in se intellectum actus et praepositionis ». Unde factum est, ut SS. Patres in his vocabulis, priusquam consuetudine ecclesiastica determinatum sensum acceperant, in du- / -plici . . .

SCHOLIUM

I. Since the terms "*substance*" and "*subsistence*" have been composed from the preposition "*sub-*" and the verb "*stare*" (i.e. "to stand") or "*sistere*" (.e. "to cause to stand"), they can have a twofold sense from (their) etymology, or as St. Bonaventure says (here in the body of the question), they have « in themselves an understanding of an act and of a preposition ». Whence it happened, that the Holy Fathers, before these had accepted a determinate sense from the ecclesiastical custom, used them in a two- / -fold . . .

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[1] In aliquibus mss. ut A P Q Y desideratur *secundum substantiam*. In fine argumenti cod. T *substantia* pro *substantias*.

[2] Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9: Hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere. — Paulo infra post *ita* in nonnullis codd. ut A I T et ed. 1 deest *et* ac in cod. V dein *debet dici*.

[3] Epist. 15. n. 4: « Quisquam, rogo, ore sacrilego tres substantias praedicabit »? In quo textu plures codd. cum ed. 1 *praedicavit*.

[4] Vat., posito *et* pro *vel*, repetit dein *quasi stans*, sed contra sex primas edd. et mss., ex quibus tamen codd. C O T repetunt tantum *quasi*; cod. cc et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 minus bene *sive* loco *vel*.

[5] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *tunc*.

[6] In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba *hoc nomen*, quae tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 exhibentur; e contra paulo infra post *usiosi* Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 adiungit *et*.

[7] Libr. de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi, ch. 3, ubi et Tullius allegatur. — Mox lectio mutila Vat., qua pro verbis *aequipollet* usque *hypostasi* substituitur *et substantia aequipollent*, resarcitur fide mss. et ed. 1.

[8] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *et* pro *sed*.

[9] Vat. cum codice cc tantum addit *etiam*.

[10] Cod. S W *aequivalet*. Paulo infra post secundum *ideo* ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *nec* pro *non*.

[11] In Vat. et cod. cc deest *et*; in codd. aa bb vero

[1] In some manuscripts, such as A P Q and Y, there is wanting *according to substance* [secundum substantiam]. At the end of the argument, codex T reads *according to substance* [substantia] for *substances* [substantias].

[2] On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 4, n. 9: It is for God (the same) "to be" as "to subsist". — A little below this, after *so* [ita] in not a few codices, such as A I and T, and edition 1, there is lacking *also* [et] and in codex V there is then lacking *there ought to be said* [debet dici].

[3] Epistle 15, n. 4: « Will any, I ask, with a sacrilegious mouth, preach Three Substances »? In which text very many codices together with edition 1 read *Has . . . preached* [praedicavit].

[4] The Vatican edition, having put *and* [et] for *and/or* [vel], then repeats *a quasi standing* [quasi stans], but contrary to the six first editions and the manuscripts, of which, however, codices C O and T, repeat only *as if* [quasi]; codex cc and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, have less well *or* [sive] in place of *and/or* [vel].

[5] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the here added *then* [tunc].

[6] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there are wanting the words *this name* [hoc nomen], which, however, are exhibited in the other manuscripts and edition 1; and contrariwise a little below this, after *ousiosis*, the Vatican edition, contrary to very many

post *illae* additur *auctoritates vel*. Mox plures mss. ut A F G H I T Y etc. cum ed. 1 *aequivalet* pro *aequipollet*.
[12] Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit *est*, et paulo infra substituit *nomine illo* pro *nomen illud* ac dein *accipitur* loco *accipit*; sed obest auctoritas ed. 1 et aliorum mss., e quibus plures ponunt *accepit*.

codices and edition 1, adds *and* [et].
[7] On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, ch. 3, where (Marcus) Tullius (Cicero) is also cited. — Next the mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, by which for the words *is equipollent to* [aequipollet] to *is equipollent to* [aequipollere] there is substituted *and "substance" are equipollent to* [et substantia aequipollent], is repaired on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1.
[8] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *and* [et] for *but* [sed].
[9] The Vatican edition, together with only codex cc, adds *also* [etiam].
[10] Codex S and W have *it is equivalent to* [aequivalet]. A little below this after the second *for that reason* [ideo], we have substituted from very many manuscripts and edition 1, *neither* [nec] for *not* [not].
[11] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is lacking *both* [et]; in codices aa and bb, however, after *those* [illae] there is added *authorities and/or* [auctoritates vel]. Next very many manuscripts, such as A F G H I T Y etc., together with edition 1, have *equivalent* [aequivalet] for *equipollent* [aequipollet].
[12] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has the complete verbal form for *must it be judged* [iudicandum est], and a little below this has reads *of those using that name, namely "substance", it is accepted* [utentium nomine illo . . . accipitur etc.] for has *of those using (it), accepts that name, namely substance* [utentium nomen illud . . accipit etc.]; but the authority of edition 1 and of the other manuscripts withstand this, very many of which have *accepted* [accepit] for *accepts* [accipit].

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sensu usi sint, et per consequens ad hanc quaestionem vel affirmative vel negative respondere potuerint.

sense in their vocabularies, and consequently were able to respond to this question either in the affirmative or negative.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 57. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. ad 4. 5; S. I. q. 29. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 10. a. 43. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. S. a. 53. a. 5. n. 37, et a. 75. q. 2. n. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 57, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, in reply to n n. 4 and 5; Summa., I, q. 29, a. 2, in reply to n. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus, here in a. 3; on this and the following question, Summa., p. I, tr. 10, a. 43, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, Summa., a. 53, a. 5, n. 37, and a. 75, q. 2, n. 8. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

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square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 413-414.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 413-414.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum plures essentiae in divinis numerari possint.

Secundo quaeritur de numeratione illius nominis *essentia*. Et quod non numeretur, ostenditur *sic*:[1]

1. Quia in divinis est unitas absolutissima, quae non multiplicatur: ergo cum nullum nomen sit adeo absolutum, sicut nomen *essentiae*, ergo per illud significatur unitas non multiplicata: ergo nomen *essentiae* non numeratur; et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, quod ratio repugnat.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a *minori*. Hoc enim nomen *Deus* est nomen essentiae in comparatione ad personam; sed secundum Scripturam in Lege, scilicet Deuteronomii sexto,[3] Deus dicitur unus et non plures; et secundum Symbolum:[4] « Non tres dii, sed

QUESTION 2

Whether among the divine there can be numbered many "essences".

Second there is asked concerning the numbering of that name "*essence*". And that it is not numbered, is shown *in this manner*:[1]

1. Because among the divine there is a most absolute Unity, which is not multiplied: therefore since no name is absolute to such an extent, as the name for '*essence*', therefore, through that there is signified a non-multiplied unity: therefore the name for '*essence*' is not numbered; and this is what (St.) Augustine says, what reason resists [repugnat].

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *a minori*. For this name "*God*" is a name for the Essence in comparison to a Person, but according to Scripture, in the Law, that is, in the sixth (chapter) of Deuteronomy,[3] God is said (to be) One and not many: and

unus est Deus »: ergo et hoc nomen *essentia* multo minus plurificatur, cum dicatur absolutius.

according to the Creed:[4] « Not three gods, but one is God »: therefore also this name "*essence*" is much less plurified, since is it said more absolutely.

3. Item, natura divina non multiplicatur in tribus; sed hoc nomen *essentia* est nomen divinae naturae, ut hoc nomen *substantia*: ergo nec *essentia* nec *substantia* multiplicantur[5] sub propriis nominibus, ut videtur.

3. Likewise, the Divine Nature is not multiplied in the Three; but this name *"essence*" is a name for the Divine Nature, as (is) this name "*substance*": therefore neither the Essence nor the Substance are multiplied[5] under their own names, as it seems.

CONTRA: 1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate:[6] « Cur haec tria non dicantur una persona », et loquitur de tribus personis; sed neutrum genus respicit essentiam: ergo cum dicantur tria, ergo tres essentiae.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine in the seventh (book) On the Trinity (says):[6] « Why are these Three [tria] not said (to be) one Person ? », and he is speaking of the Three Persons; but the neuter gender (of the word "Three") respects the Essence: therefore since They are said (to be) "Three", therefore (They are) "Three essences".

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: Augustinus in eodem libro[7] dicit, quod « Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicuntur tres personae, quia commune est eis hoc quod est *persona* »; sed hoc nomen *essentia* est commune: ergo potest dici *tres essentiae*.

2. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: (St.) Augustine in the same book[7] says, that « the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are said (to be) "three persons", because that which is a *person* is common to Them »; but this name "*essence*" is a common one: therefore "*three persons*" can be said.

3. Item, ibidem dicit, et habetur in littera,[8] quod « ideo dicuntur tres personae, quia Pater est persona, et Filius persona et Spiritus sancuts persona ». Ergo similiter sunt tres essentiae, quia Pater est essentia etc.

3. Likewise, in the same place he says, and (as) is had in the text,[8] that « for that reason They are said (to be) "three persons", because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit a person ». Therefore, similarly, They are "three essences", because the Father is an essence etc..

4. Item, Pater et Filius sunt entes plures, ergo plures habentes entitatem — sequitur enim: sunt plures dii, ergo plures deitates[9] — similiter: Pater et Filius sunt: ergo plura esse, ergo plures essentiae.

4. Likewise, the Father and the Son are many beings [entes], therefore many having entity — for it follows: 'there are many gods, therefore many deities'[9] — similarly: 'the Father and the Son are: therefore (They are) many 'beings' [plura esse]', therefore many essences.

CONCLUSIO.

Essentia non numeratur in divinis, quia una eademque natura non numerata est in tribus personis.

CONCLUSION

"Essence" is not numbered among the divine, because in the Three Persons the One and Same Nature has not been numbered.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod in omni substantia, cuius est esse et operari, necessario intelligimus *naturam* et *habentem* naturam. Cum ergo hoc[10] sit in Deo, intelligimus in Deo naturam et

I RESPOND: It must be said, that in every substance, of which there is a 'being' [esse] and an operating [operari], we necessarily understand a *nature* and *one having* a the nature. Therefore, since this[10] is in God, we

habentem naturam. Et naturam dicimus substantiam vel essentiam; habentem naturam dicimus personam. Quoniam[11] ergo in creatura rationi contingit, unam personam habere plures naturas, scilicet corporalem et spiritualem: sic a contrario sensu in Deo propter sum- / -mam . . .

[1] Nonnulli codd. ut A T X Y *hoc ostenditur* et ed. 1 *hic ostenditur* pro *ostenditur sic*.
[2] Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. et 5. Cfr. etiam infra dub. 3. circa lit.
[3] Vers. 4: Audi Israel Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est.
[4] Scil. Athanasianum; in verbis ex ipso allegatis plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*. Mox post *ergo* fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *et* ac dein ex multis codd. ut A F H M N T Z etc. et ed. 1 *multo*, plures autem codd. ut K V X aa bb ponunt, eodem sensu servato, *multo fortius non* pro *multo minus*. Tandem in fine argumenti codd. sunt inter se divisi: alii enim, et quidem boni, ut A F G S T Z cum ed. 1 ponunt *dicat*, alii vero *dicatur*.
[5] Ex pluribus codd. ut A S T V W etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 substituimus *multiplicantur* pro *multiplicatur*. Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *et* loco *ut*.
[6] Cap. 4. n. 8: Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem coniunctionem haec tria (scil. Pater, Filius et Spiritus sanctus) simul unus Deus, cur non etiam una persona etc. — Vide etiam hic in littera Magistri, c. 4, ubi alius textus Augustinis ex eodem capite citatur, in quo recurrit verbum *dicantur*, pro quo et originale et plures codd. cum ed. 1 ponunt *dicuntur*. Respectu horum verborum Augustini magna invenitur in mss. varietas; sic plures ut B D F G H I Q T V cum ed. 1 legunt *Cum* pro *Cur*, quod in paucis ut P Z omittitur; dein aliqui codd. ut A P S T omittunt particulam *non*, et nonnulli ut V X bb post *dicantur* addunt *de*. Mox post *personis* exhibemus lectionem codd. T aa bb; ceteri codd. fere omnes pro *sed neutrum genus* habent *ergo proprie*, quae lectio corruptionem textus, vel omissionem plurium verborum sapit. Vat. cum cod. cc *sed Tria in neutro genere respicit*.
[7] Cap. 4. n. 7. 8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
[8] Hic. c. 3; quo in textu solummodo Vat. cum cod. cc tre recurrenti nomini *persona* praefigit *una*, multi codd. cum ed. 1 tantum semel scil. prima vice, plures tandem codd. ut G H M Y omnino omittunt, quos sequimur, utpote qui et cum originali et cum littera Magistri conveniunt. Mox fide plurium mss. ut H M P Q X Z et exigente forma argumenti adiecimus *Ergo*.
[9] Ita mss. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae post *entes* omittit *plures* ac dein pro *habentes entitatem* ponit *habent entitates*. Paulo infra post *similiter* cod. O repetit *sequitur*.
[10] Nempe: esse et operari fundatum in substantia. — Mox post *intelligimus* in codd. aa bb additur *necessario*.
[11] Sequimur plurimos codd. et ed. 1 substituendo *Quoniam* pro *Quomodo*, et paulo infra post *sic*

understand in God a Nature and One having the Nature. And we say that "the Nature" (is) "the Substance" and/or "the Essence"; we say that "the One having the Nature" (is) "a Person". Therefore, since[11] in a rational creature it happens, that one person has many natures, that is, the corporal and the spiritual: so in a contrary sense, in God, on account of (His) most . . .

[1] Not a few codices, such as A T X and Y, have *this is shown* [hoc ostenditur] and edition 1 has *here it is shown* [hic ostenditur] for *is shown in this manner* [ostenditur sic].
[2] See here in the text of Master (Peter), chs. 4 and 5. Cf. also below in dubium 3, on the text.
[3] Verse 4: *Hear o Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One* [Audi Israel Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est].
[4] Namely, the Athanasian Creed; in the words cited from it, very many codices together with edition 1 omit *is* [est]. Next after *therefore* [ergo], trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted *also* [et] and then, from many codices, such as A F H M N T Z etc., and edition 1, we have inserted *much* [multo], but very many codices, such as K V X aa and bb, conserving the same sense, put *much more strongly not* [multo fortius non] for *much less* [multo minus]. Finally, at the end of the argument, the codices are divided amongst themselves: for some, and indeed good ones, such as A F G S T Z, together with edition 1, put *it speaks* [dicat], but others *is it said* [dicatur].
[5] From very many codices, such as A S T V W etc., together with editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, we have substituted *are multiplied* [multiplicantur] for *is multiplied* [multiplicatur]. A little before this very many codices, together with edition 1, have *and . . . (is likewise)* [et] for *as (is)* [ut].
[6] Chapter 4, n. 8: Or since on account of the ineffable conjunction these Three (namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit) together (are) the one God, why (are They) not also one person etc.. — See also here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 4, where another text of St. Augustine taken from the same chapter is cited, in which the verb *are . . . said (to be)* [dicantur] is repeated, in place of which both the original and very many codices, together with edition 1, have the indicative form *are . . . said (to be)* [dicuntur]. In respect to these words of (St.) Augustine there is found a great variation in the manuscripts; thus very many, such as B D F G H I Q T and V, together with edition 1, read *Though/Since* [Cum] for *Why* [Cur], which is omitted in a few, such as P and Z; then some codices, such as A P S and T, omit the particle *not* [non], and not a few, such as V X and bb, after *said* [dicantur] read *of* [de] for *(to be)*. Next after *Persons* [personis], we exhibit the reading of codices T aa and bb; nearly all the other codices, in place of *but the neuter gender (of)* [sed neutrum genus], have *therefore properly* [ergo proprie], which reading is either reflects corruption of the text, and/or an omission of several words.

expugnendo *et*.

[7] Chapter 4, nn. 7 and 8. See here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3.

[8] Here in c. 3; to which only in the text of the Vatican edition, together with codex X, there is prefixed to each of the three recurrences of *person* [persona] the word *one* [una], though many codices, together with edition 1, omit it only once, that is, the first time, but very many codices, such as G H M and Y omits these entirely, which reading we follow, as it convenes with both that of the original and the text of Master (Peter). Next, trusting in very many manuscripts, such as H M P Q X and Z, and as required by the form of the argument, we have inserted *Therefore* [Ergo].

[9] Thus the manuscripts and the six first editions, contrary to the Vatican edition, which omits *many* [plures] from *many beings* [entes plures] and then in place of *many having entity* [plura habents entitatem] reads *the Many have entities* [plura habent entitates]. A little below this after *similarly* [similiter] codex O repeats *there follows* [sequitur].

[10] Namely: a 'being' and operating founded in a substance. — Next after *we . . . understand* [intelligimus], in codices aa and bb there is added another *necessarily* [necessario].

[11] We follow the very many codices and edition 1, by substituting *since* [Quoniam] for *in that manner in which* [Quomodo], and a little below this after *so* [sic], by expunging the *also* [et].

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sum- / -mam simplicitatem contingit, unam naturam haberi a pluribus, quoniam[1] contingit eam haberi alio et alio modo; et hoc non potest esse ab eodem. Quia ergo una tantum est natura habita et non numerata, ideo tantum dicitur una substantia et essentia; quia vero plures habentes, ideo plures personae, nulla omnino repugnantia existente.

high simplicity it happens, that the one Nature is had by many (Persons), since[1] it happens that It is had in one and another manner; and this cannot be by the Same. Therefore, because there is only one Nature had and (It is) not numbered, for that reason there is only said (to be) "one Substance and Essence"; however, because (there are) Many having (It), for that reason (there are) many Persons, with entirely no existing repugnance.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de essentia per hoc quod Augustinus dicit: *Haec tria*; dicendum, quod minus expresse loquitur et improprie; et ideo verbum eius est expondendum.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected concerning "essence" through this which (St.) Augustine says: "*these Three*"; it must be said, that he speaks less expressly and improperly; and for that reason his word must be explained.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ideo *tres* personae,[2] quia persona est *commune*, et quilibet est *persona* etc.; dicendum, quod non dicit totam rationem, sed partem quantum ad verbum exterius; ideo oportet intelligere, quod ibi[3] additur: quia est commune quod distinguitur. Unde Pater est persona et Filius est persona, non eadem, sed alia.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that therefore *Three P*ersons,[2] because "person" is common, and Any is a *person* etc.; it must be said, that ("person") does not mean the whole reckoning, but the part as much as regards the exterior word; for that reason one is bound to understand, that there is added there:[3] 'because what is distinguished is common'. Whence the

Father is a person, and the Son is a person, not for the same (reason), but for another.

4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur, dicendum, quod *ens* aliquando dicitur substantive, et sic non trahit numerum aliunde; aliquando[4] tenetur adiective, et sic trahit numerum a supposito, et sic non numeratur forma; et hoc modo non sequitur, quod sint *plures entitates*, nec de hoc verbo *sunt*, quod *plura esse*.

4. To the last which is objected, it must be said, that sometimes *being* [ens] is said as a substantive [substantive], and thus does not draw a number from elsewhere; sometimes[4] it is held as an adjective [adiective], and thus draws (its) number from (its) subject [supposito], and thus is not numbered in form; and in this manner it does not follow, that there are *many entities*, nor from this word "They are" [sunt], that (there are) *many 'beings'* [plura esse].

SCHOLION.

I. Pro intelligentia solut. ad 3. notandum, quod communitas *essentiae* alio sensu accipitur quam communitas *personae* sive personarum. Illa est communitas unius eiusdemque rei, haec vero communitas tantum rationis (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 5.). Unde haec dicit aliquid commune, quod est *distinctum* in tribus personis. Sic intelligitur, quod habetur in solut. ad 3, scil. quod ratio, quae hic ex S. Augutino affertur, tangit tantum partem causae, quare dicantur tres personae. Nam in ratione personae includitur proprietas, et ratione huius plurificantur personae.

II. In solut. ad 4. verba: « Non trahit numerum aliunde » sic intelligenda sunt: cum *ens in genere masculino* iam significet suppositum, a se, non ab alio supposito, trahit numerum. Sed *ens in genere neutro* non significat suppositum, sed essentiam seu formam; unde si ipsi adiunguntur termini numerales sive partitivi, ut *aliud*, *alterum*, multiplicatio significatur essentiae sive formae, quod in divinis est omnino falsum.

III.

SCHOLIUM

I. For an understanding of the solution to n. 3 it must be noted, that a community of *essence* is accepted in a sense other than a community of *person* or of persons. The former is a community of one same thing, but the latter a communion only of reckoning; cf. St. Thomas, Summa, I, q. 30, a. 4; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 5. Whence the latter means something common, which is *distinct* in the Three Persons. Thus there is understood, what is had in the solution to n. 3, namely, that the reckoning, which here is cited from St. Augustine, touches only part of the cause, whereby They are said (to be) "Three Persons". For in the reckoning of "person" there is included "property", and for this reason the Persons are plurified.

II. In the solution to n. 4, the words: « it does not drawn a number from elsewhere » are to be understood in this manner: since ens *in the masculine gender* here (i.e. when there was said in n. 4, "many 'beings' " [sunt entes plura]) signifies a "supposit", it draws its number, from itself, not from another supposit. But ens in the neuter gender does not signify a supposit, but an essence or form; whence if numeral or partitive terms, such as aliud ("other"), alterum ("the other"), are adjoined to it, there is signified a multiplication of the essence or form, which among the divine is entirely false.

III.

[1] Maior numerus mss. cum ed. 1 *quoniam* loco *quia*. Paulo infra post *Quia ergo* auctoritate antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 posuimus cohaerenter cum praecedentibus *una* pro *eadem*. Mox post *essentia* codd. aa bb repetunt *et non numerata*, et post *ideo plures* cod. K additur *dicuntur*.

[1] A greater number of the manuscripts, together with edition 1, read *since* [quoniam] in place of *because* [quia]. A little below this after *Therefore, because* [Quia ergo], on the authority of the more ancient codices and edition 1, we have put *one* [una] for *the same* [eadem], to make the sense more

[2] Ex codd. K P Q aa et ed. 1 adiecimus *personae*, et mox ex cod. H et ed. 1 pro *quaelibet* substituimus *quilibet*, scil. Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, sicuti in *tertia* obiectione erxhibetur; proponit siquidem S. Doctor breviter *secundum* et *tertium* obiectionem. Quo attento, et lectio in textum recepta vera comprobatur (ex ipsis obiectionum verbis), et ratio insinuatur diversarum in mss. existentium lectionum. Nam praeter lectionem iam ex Vat. allatam ab aliquibus codd. ut A T ponitur *ideo* pro *quilibet*, ab aliis pro *quilibet, est pesona*, immo in codd. P Q verba *et quilibet est persona* simpliciter omittuntur.
[3] August., VII. de Trin. c. 4-6, ubi haec propositio continetur quoad sensum in his, quae ibi dicit contra Sabellium, qui locus a Magistro habetur in cap. 4. Clarius adhuc ab August. in c. 5. et 6. explanatur, quod persona dicit aliquid commune quod *distinguitur*, essentia vero commune aliquid indistinctum. — In fine responsionis post *alia* Vat. cum cod. cc mins apte et contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 addit *et alia*.
[4] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minus congruenter *alio modo* pro *aliquando*. In fine responsionis auctoritate codd. H P Q Z aa supplevimus *sunt*, quod contextus omnino exigit.

coherent with the preceding. Next after *Essence* [essentia] codices aa and bb repeat *and (it is) not numbered* [et non numerata], and after *and for that reason* [ideo] codex K reads *the Many are said (to be) "Persons"* [plures dicantur personae].
[2] From codices K P Q and aa, and edition 1, we have inserted *Persons* [personae], and next from codex H and edition 1, we have substituted the masculine form for *Any* [quilbet] for the feminine *Any* [quaelibet], to indicate the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as is exhibited in the third objection; as if the Seraphic Doctor proposes the *second* and *third* objection briefly. By which, both the reading received in the text is confirmed as true (from the very words of the objections), and the reason for the diverse readings in the manuscripts is suggested. For beside the reading of the Vatican text now cited, by some codices, such as A and T, there is put *for that reason* [ideo] for *Any* [quilibet], by others in place of the same there is had *He is a person, He* [est persona], but in codices P and Q the words *and Any is a person* [et quilibet est persona] is simply omitted.
[3] (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. VII, chs. 4-6, where this proposition is contained according to its sense among those, which he says against Sabellius, which passage is had by Master (Peter) in chapter 4. It is explained more clearly by (St.) Augustine in chapters 5 and 6, that "person" means 'something common which is distinguished', but "essence" 'something common undistinguished'. — At the end of the response in place of *but for another (reason)* [sed alia], the Vatican edition together with codex cc, less aptly, and contrary to the more ancient codices together with edition 1, reads *but for one (reason) and another* [sed alia et alia].
[4] Very many codices, together with edition 1, have less congruently *in another manner* [alio modo] for *sometimes* [aliquando]. At the end of the response, on the authority of codices H P Q Z and aa, we have supplied "*They are*" [sunt], which the context entirely requires.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

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Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of

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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

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COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

ARTICLE II

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 414-416.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum catholice dicere plures deos possimus.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum catholice possimus dicere plures deos. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Hoc nomen *Deus* recipit distinctivum terminum ratione suppositionis, ut cum dicitur, Deus generat Deum: ergo cum eadem distinctio importetur per hoc quod est *generat* et per hoc quod est *tres*, quia personalis, ergo haec[5] pari ratione est catholica: tres dii sunt.

2. Item, idem est *Deus* quod *habens deitatem*; sed plures sunt habentes deitatem — hoc dicitur catholice — ergo similiter plures dii sunt.

3. Item, hoc nomen *Deus*, quamvis sit substantiale, tamen impositum est ab operatione. Sed contingit, operationem pluraliter dici de personis, ut patet Genesis primo:[6] *Faciamus hominem* etc.: ergo et hoc nomen *dii*.

4. Item, ad numerationem alicuius veram non plura requiruntur quam vera multiplicatio suppositorum et formae; sed haec est in Deo, quia tres sunt personae divinae; *persona* dicit suppositum, *divinae*[7] formam: ergo etc.

QUESTION 3

Whether in a Catholic manner we can say that there are "many Gods".

Third there is asked, whether in a Catholic manner we can say that there are "many Gods". And that it is so, seems in this manner:

1. This name "*God*" receives a distinctive term by reason of (its) supposition, as when there is said, "God generates God": therefore since the same distinction is conveyed through that which "*generates*" is and through that which "the Three" is, because (it is) a personal (distinction), therefore for an equal reason this[5] is Catholic: "the Three are Gods".

2. Likewise, "*God*" is the same as "*One having deity*"; but there are Many "Ones having deity" — this is said in the Catholic manner — therefore similarly the Many are "Gods".

3. Likewise, this name "*God*", though it is substantial, yet it has been imposed from (His) operation. But it happens, that (the divine) operation is said plurally of the Persons, as is clear in the first (chapter) of Genesis: *Let us make man* etc.:[6] therefore also this name "*Gods*".

4. Likewise, for the true numbering of anything, more are not required than a true multiplication of supposits and forms; but this is in God, because the Three are Divine Persons; "*Person*" means a supposit, "Divine" (means)[7] a form: ergo etc..

5. Item, cum omne generale contingat specifi- / -cari, . . .

5. Likewise, since everything general happens to be / specified, . . .

[5] In plurimis mss. ut I T deest *haec*.
[6] Vers. 26. — Mox post *ergo* ex multis mss. ut A F G I M S T etc. et ed. 1 supplevimus particulam *et*. Dein cod. Z *Deus* pro *dii*.
[7] In antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic non repetitur *dicit*, sicuti in Vat. et cod. cc fit. In plurali conveniunt codd. et edd.

[5] In very many manuscripts, such as I and I, there is had *it is* [est] for *this is* [haec est].
[6] Verse 26. — Next after *therefore* [ergo], from many manuscripts, such as A F G I M S T etc., and edition 1, we have supplied the particle *also* [et].
[7] In the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, here there is not repeated *means* [dicit], though in the Vatican edition and codex cc it is present.

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specifi- / -cari, et persona sit nomen generale, videtur quod possit specificari, cum dicitur: tres personae, ut dicatur adhuc specialius *qui tres*; sed hoc non potest esse, nisi addatur nomen commune tribus, nec est aliud dare quam hoc nomen *Deus*: ergo etc.[1]

to be / specified, and "person" is a general name, it seems that it can be specified, when there is said: "Three Persons", to say in a still more special manner *which Three*, but this cannot be, unless a common name is added to the Three, nor is there a giving (of a name) other than this name "*God*": ergo etc..[1]

Contra: 1. Quod non dicatur catholice, patet ex mandatis, Deuteronomii sexto:[2] *Audi Israel, Deus tuus Deus usus est*. Item in Symbolo:[3] « Non tres dii, sed unus est Deus ».

On the contrary: 1. That it is not said in a Catholic manner, it clear from the Commandments, according to the sixth (chapter) of Deuteronomy:[2] *Hear o Israel, thy God is one God*. Likewise in the Creed (there is said):[3] « Not three gods, but one is God ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia hoc nomen *Deus* dicit divinam naturam; sed divina natura non numeratur sive plurificatur:[4] ergo nec hoc nomen *Deus*.

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by *reason*, because this name "*God*" means the Divine Nature; but the Divine Nature is not numbered or plurified:[4] therefore neither (is) this name "*God*".

CONCLUSIO.

Licet sint tres personae, tamen secundum fidem catholicam non possumus dicere, tres esse deos.

CONCLUSION

Though there are Three Persons, however, according to the Catholic Faith, we cannot say, that there are Three Gods.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non est dicere plures deos catholice, quia numerus pluralis significat plurificationem termini secundum suppositum et formam in nomine substantivo, cum plurale geminet suum singulare. Et ideo, cum form importata per hoc nomen *Deus* non sit multiplicata, non debet dici *plures dii*.

I respond: It must be said, that there is no saying of "many gods" in a catholic manner, because a plural number signifies the plurification of the term according to supposit and form in a substantive name, since the plural doubles [geminet] its singular. And for that reason, since the form conveyed through this name "*God*" is not multiplied, it ought not be said that (there are) "*many gods*".

1. Ad illud ergo[5] quod obiicitur, quod catholic dicitur: Deus generat; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia *generat* importat simul distinctionem cum convenientia; sed

1. To that, therefore,[5] which is objected, that in a Catholic manner there is said: "God generates"; it must be said, that it is not similar, because "*generates*" conveys

plures deos simpliciter importat distinctionem quantum ad suppositum et formam.

simultaneously a distinction with a convening; but "*that the Many (are) Gods*" conveys simply a distinction as much as regards supposit and form.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est *Deus* quod *habens deitatem*; respondeo dupliciter: quod[6] *habens deitatem* uno modo potest dici *neutraliter*, et sic est unum solum, et aequipollet ei, quod est *Deus*, quod quidem dicit *quod est*; alio modo *masculine*, et sic non habet aequipollens, et sic multiplicatur.

2. To that which is objected, that "*God*" is the same as "*One having deity*"; I respond in a two fold manner: that[6] "*One having deity*" can be said in one manner *in the neuter (gender)* [neutraliter], and in this manner there is only the One, and it is equipollent to that, which is "*God*", which indeed means *what He is*; in another manner *in the masculine (gender)* [masculine], and in this manner it has not equipollent (expression), and thus is multiplied.

Potest tamen aliter dici, quod *Deus* non significat *habentem*, sed significat *deitatem* in comparatione ad habentem; et ideo non multiplicatur.

However, it can be said in another manner, that "*God*" does not signify "*One having*", but signifies (rather) "*the Deity*" in comparison to the One having; and for that reason it is not multiplied.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur[7] de operatione, dicendum, quod nomen potest significare operationem per modum *adiacentis*, et sic trahit numerum aliunde; vel per modum *substantivi*, et sic non multiplicatur, et taliter significat hoc nomen *Deus*.

3. To that which is objected[7] concerning (the divine) operation, it must be said, that a name can signify an operation through the manner of an *adjective* [adiacentis], and in this manner it draws (its) number from elsewhere; and/or through the manner of a *substantive*, and in this manner it is not multiplied, and this name "*God*" signifies in such a manner.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ibi est multiplicatio suppositorum et formae; dicendum, quod hoc nomen *divinum* est quasi possesssivum; unde imponitur a duplici forma, scilicet *possessionis* et *possessoris*. Et forma deitatis est in ratione *possessoris*; et forma possessoris existente indivisa, numeratur forma *possessionis*, ut *oves Socraticae*; sic et in proposito;[8] unde non numeratur forma habita.

4. To the last which is objected, that there is a multiplication of supposits and forms There; it must be said, that this name "*Divine*" is a quasi possessive; wherefore it is imposed by a twofold form, that is, (by the form) of *possession* and (by the form) of *the possessor*. And the form of deity is in the reckoning of a *possessor*; and the individual, existing form of a possessor, is numbered according to the form of *possession*, such as "*the sheep of Socrates*" [oves Socraticae]; thus (is it) also in the proposed (in its own manner);[8] whence the form had is not numbered.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generale contingit specificari; dicendum, quod persona, cum nominet[9] individuum intellectualis naturae, dupliciter potest specificari, videlicet per *propria personarum*, ut cum dicitur: tres personae, id est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; potest etiam specificari per *naturae determinationem*, ut si dicatur: personae divinae vel angelicae vel humanae.

5. To that which is objected, that a general (name) happens to be specified; it must be said, that a person, since it names[9] an individual of an intellectual nature, can be specified in a twofold manner, namely, through (the names) *proper to the Persons*, as when there is said: "the Three Persons, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit"; it can also be specified through a *determination of nature*, as if there be said:

"divine and/or angelic and/or human persons".

Et *si tu quaeras*,[10] quare non specificatur per unum nomen, sicut est in creaturis; quod tres personae angelicae dicuntur tres Angeli; responderi potest, quod hoc est propter inopiam humani eloquii, qua laborat tam lingua Graeca quam Latina, sed . . .

And *if you ask*,[10] for what reason it is not specified through one name, just as it is among creatures; because three angelic persons are said (to be) three Angels; it can be responded, that this is on account of the need of human speech, under which both the Greek tongue and the Latin labor, but . . .

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[1] Sensus est: in hac dictione *tres personae* nomen *personae*, cum sit nomen genericum, specificari debet, ut cognoscatur, quales seu *qui* sint tres; sed hoc fieri nequit nisi additione huius nominis *Deus*, quod est tribus commune, dicendo *tres diii*.

[2] Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata: Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est. — Lectionem in textum receptam exhibent codd. et lit. Magistri, hic c. 3. Cfr. etiam lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 4.

[3] Athanasiano. — In quo versiculo plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*. Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc *Unde* pro *Item*.

[4] Vat. *specificatur*, sed praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1; cod. V *non multiplicatur*, cum quo concordat cod. X, qui tamen particulam *non* omittit.

[5] Fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *ergo*. Mox post *generat* in cod. X additur *Deum*. Dein in cod. O post *quia generat* adiungitur *importat distinctionem in suppositis, non in forma, quia*. Tandem cod. bb ponit *vel tres*, codd. A S T *tres* pro *deos*.

[6] Vat. cum nonnullis tantum codd. *et* loco *quod*; lectio in textum recepta comprobatur insuper verbis ipsius obiectionis supra positis. Mox Vat. *respondeo, quod ista locutio est duplex, quia* pro *respondeo dupliciter: quod*, sed contra ed. 1 et codd., qui tamen verba sequentia *uno modo* incongue propter confusionem subnexorum transponunt post *dupliciter*.

[7] Vat. cum cod. cc *dicitur*. Mox post *nomen* in mss. et ed. 1 deest particula *vel* a Vat. addita. In fine responsionis codd. aa bb legunt *plurificatur* pro *multiplicatur*. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 2 eandem obiectionem resolvens ait: Dicendum, quod quamvis hoc nomen Deus sit nomen operationis, praeter hoc habet intellectum substantiae perfectae et per se stantis. Operatio autem divina significatur dupliciter: *adiective* sive verbaliter, quia verba significant in adiacentia, et ideo propter pluralitatem personarum pluraliter significatur, cum dicitur: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem*. Aliquando vero *substantive* et nominaliter, non per modum adiacentis, quae quidem operatio est eadem quod divina substantia, et ideo non recipiet pluralitatem.

[8] Intellige: suo modo. Nam in allato exemplo forma possessoris (Socrates) est unica, forma possessionis (oves) est multiplex. Unde pluralis (Socraticae) non ad possessorem, sed ad possessionem refertur. Aliter est in locutio *personae divinae*, ubi una forma divina est in tribus personis. Unde pluralis (divinae) refertur ad tres possessores, qui numerantur, non ad formam sive divinam naturam. — Ed. 1 post *rationis*

[1] The sense is: in this saying "*Three Persons*" the name for '*person*', since it is a generic name, ought to be specified, so that there is cognized, what kind of or *which* are the Three; but this cannot be done except by the addition of this name "*God*", which is common to the Three, by saying "*Three Gods*".

[2] Verse 4, where the Vulgate reads: *Hear o Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One* [Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est]. — The reading received in the text is exhibited by the codices and the text of Master (Peter), here in ch. 3. Cf. also the text of Master (Peter), d. II, ch. 4.

[3] The Athanasian (Creed). — In which versicle, very many codices together with edition 1, omit *is* [est]. A little before this the Vatican edition together with codex cc, reads *Wherefore* [Unde] for *Likewise* [Item].

[4] The Vatican edition has *specified* [specificatur], but contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, codex V reads *nor multiplied* [sive non multiplicatur] for *or plurified* [sive plurificatur], with which codex X agrees, by reading *or multiplied* [sive multiplicatur].

[5] Trusting in many manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted *therefore* [ergo]. Next after *generates* [generat] in codex X there is added *God* [Deum]. Then in codex O after *because "generates"* [quia generat] there is added *conveys a distinction among the supposits, not in the form, because it* [importat distinctionem in suppositis, non in forma, quia]. Finally, codex bb put *and/or the Three* [vel tres], codices A S and T, *the Three* [tres] for *Gods* [deos].

[6] The Vatican edition, with not a few codices, has *as* [ut] in place of *that* [quod]; the reading received in the text is confirmed moreover by the words posited above in the objection itself. Next the Vatican edition has *I respond, that that expressing is twofold, because* [respondeo, quod ista locutio est duplex, quia] for *I respond in a twofold manner: that* [responde dupliciter: quod], but contrary to edition 1 and to the codices, which, however, in congruously transpose the words *in one manner* [uno modo] after *in a twofold manner* [dupliciter] on account of the confusion of what is subjoined.

[7] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *is said* [dicitur]. Next after *a name* [nomen] in the manuscripts and edition 1 there is lacking the particle *either* [vel], added by the Vatican edition. At the end of the response codices aa and bb read *plurified* [plurificatur] for *multiplied* [multiplicatur]. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 50, m. 2,

possessoris loco *et* ponit *contingit autem quod*.
[9] Vat. cum cod. cc *nominat* et paulo infra *scilicet* pro *videlicet*. Plures codd. in sequentibus exhibent bis *significari* loco *specificari*, sed perperam.
[10] Vat. cum cod. cc *quaeris*, quae et paulo infra post *creaturis* contra mss. et ed. 1 *ubi* pro *quod*.

resolving the same objection, says: It must be said, that though this name “God” is a name of an operation, besides this it has the understanding of a perfect substance and (of) one standing through itself. But the divine operation is signified in a twofold manner: *as an adjective* [adiective] or as a verb [verbaliter], because verbs signify upon adjacent (subjects), and for that reason on account of the plurality of the Persons, it is signified in the plural [pluraliter], when there is said: *Let us make man to Our image* [Faciamus hominem ad imaginem]. But sometimes *as a substantive* [substantive] and as a name [nominaliter], not through the manner of an adjacent [adjacentis], which operation indeed is the same as the Divine Substance, and for that reason it will not receive the plural [pluralitatem].
[8] Understand: in its own manner. For in the cited example the form of the possessor (Socrates) is unique, the form of the possession (the sheep) is plural. Whence (according to the rule of Latin syntax) the plural adjective (Socraticae) is referred not to the possessor, but to the possession. It is otherwise in the expression “the Divine Persons”, where the one form “divine” is in the Three Persons. Whence the plural adjective (divinae) is referred to the Three Possessors, who are numbered, not to the form or the Divine Nature. — Edition 1 after *reckoning of a possessor* [ratione possessoris], in place of *and* [et] puts *but it happens that* [contingit autem quod].
[Trans. note: Here *the sheep of Socrates*, lit. “the Socratic sheep”, is signified in Latin by a plural noun (oves) and a plural adjective (Socraticae), derived from the name “Socrates”. Since in English adjectives have no number, there is no equivalent comparison in our language.]
[9] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has *when it names* [cum nominat], and a little below this it reads *that is* [scilicet] for *namely* [videlicet]. Very many codices in the following propositions twice exhibit *be signified* [specificari] for *be specified* [specificari], but faultily.
[10] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has the indicative form *ask* [quaeris], which edition also a little below this, after *creatures* [creaturis], contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *where* [ubi] for *because* [quod].

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magis Latina. — Vel potest dici, quod hoc non permittit natura ipsorum nominum, quoniam nomen speciale a speciali forma imponitur. Aut ergo est impositum a *natura communi*, aut a *proprietate personae*. Si est impositum a *natura communi*, cum illa non multiplicetur, non potest[1] per unum nomen specificari. Si autem est impositum a *proprietate personae*, cum illa non conveniat tribus, non potest per illud specificari. Et ideo Ecclesia, compulsa

more the Latin. — And/or it can be said, that the nature of those names does not permit this, since a special name is imposed by a special form. Therefore, either it has been imposed by *the common Nature*, or by *a property of a Person*. If it has been imposed by *the common Nature*, since That is not multiplied, it cannot[1] be specified through one name. But if it has been imposed by *a property of a Person*, since that does not convene with the Three, it

necessitate, respondet[2] nomen generale, sive quod importat communitatem nominis, quod est commune et multiplicabile; et ideo non est quaerenda specificatio per aliud nomen nisi vel per nomen adiectivum, vel per nomina personarum.

cannot be specified through that. And for that reason the Church, compelled by necessity, responds (with)[2] a general name, or (with) what conveys the community of name, which is common and multipliable; and for that reason one is not to seek a specification through another name, except either through an adjective [nomen adiectivum], and/or through the Names of the Persons.

SCHOLION.

I. De unitate Dei iam actum est supra d. 2. q. 1, et de forma plurali huius nominis *Deus* d. 4. q. 3. Schol.

In 3. opposite. dicitur, nomen *Deus* (□□□□) impositum esse ab *operatione*. Hoc sumtum est ex Damasceno de Fide orthod. I. c. 9. (vide supra pag. 60, nota 2.). Distinctio illa in solutione a S. Bonav. adhibita aliis verbis ab Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. a. 50. m. 1. a. 2) sic explanatur: « Nomen operationis dicitur duobus modis: uno modo nomen *impositum ab operatione*, alio modo *signans operationem*. Primo modo dicit Damascenus, quod hoc nomen *Deus* est nomen operationis, quia impositum est et sumtum ab operatione fovendi, videndi vel consumendi, per quas operationes *a creatura mundi cognoscitur sempiterna virtus eius et divinitas* (Rom. 1, 20). Secundo modo non est nomen operationis, immo significat ipsam divinam naturam in quantum huiusmodi, et ad illam significandum impositum est. Quantum ergo ad illud *a quo* imponitur, dicitur a Damasceno nomen operationis; quantum ad illud cui imponitur, dicit Ambrosius, quod est nomen naturae ».

SCHOLIUM

I. The unity of God has already been dealt with above in d. 2, q. 1, and the plural form of this name "*God*" in d. 4, q. 3, Scholium.

In the 3rd opposed argument it is said, that the name "*God*" (□□□□) has been imposed from (the Divine) *operation*. This (argument) has been taken from (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 9 (see above d. 2, dubium 3, p. 60, footnote 2). The distinction employed by St. Bonaventure in the solution to n. 3 is explained in other words by Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. I, a. 50, m. 1, a. 2) in this manner: « A name for an operation is said in two manner: in one manner the name (has been) *imposed by the operation*, in another manner (the name is) *signifying an operation*. In the first manner (St. John) Damascene says, that this name "*God*" is a name of an operation, because it has been imposed and is taken from the operation of fostering, seeing and/or consummating, through which operations *from the created things of the world there is cognized His sempiternal virtue and divinity* (Rom. 1:20). In the second manner ("God") is not a name for an operation, nay it signifies the Divine Nature Itself inasmuch as (It is) of this kind, and it has been imposed to signify this. Therefore as much as regard that *by which* it is imposed, it is said by (St. John) Damascene (to be) a name of an operation; as much as that upon which it is imposed, (St.) Ambrose says, that it is a name of the Nature ».

II. Ipsam quaestionem pauci antiqui explicite tractant, ut Alex. Hal. S. I. q. 14. m. 2; q. 50. m. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 51. q. incidens 4. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 2. 1. princ. q. 1.

II. Few of the ancient authors treat of this question explicitly: Alexander of Hales, Summa., I, q. 14, m. 2; q. 50, m. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 51, incidental q. 4. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, 1st. princ., q. 1.

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[1] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *potest*

[1] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1,

pro minus aptiore *potuit*. Mox post *Si autem* plures codd. cum ed. 1 *sit* loco *est*.
[2] Vat. *imponit*, sed praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; ed. 1 cum aliquibus codd. *respondit*. Circa finem responsionis Vat. cum nonnullis tantum codd., omisso primo *vel*, pro secundo *vel* ponit *et*.

we have substituted *can* [potest] for the less apt *could* [potuit]. Next after *But if it* [Si autem] very many codices together with edition 1 have the verb in the subjunctive.
[2] The Vatican edition reads *imposes* [imponit], but contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3; edition 1, together with some codices, reads *responded (with)* [respondit]. Near the end of the response, the Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, having omitted *either* [vel], puts *and* [et] in place of the following *and/or* [vel].

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 416-417.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXIII

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 416-417.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Una usia, tres hypostases*. Videtur enim hoc esse contra illud quod dicit Hieronymous:[3] « Taceamus tres hypostases; non bona suspicionis nomen est »: ergo non debet dici. — *Praetereae* videtur, quod nomen *hypostases* nullo modo debeat recipi vel nomen *usia*, quia Boethius dicit super librum

Doubt I

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter) and first concerning this which (St. Augustine) says: *One ousia, three hypostases*. For this seems contrary to that which (St.) Jerome says:[3] « Let us pass over in silence [taceamus] the "three hypostases"; it is not a name of good esteem [suspicionis] »: therefore it ought not be said. — *Besides* it seems, that the

Praedicamentorum,[4] quod hypostasis est materia, usiosi forma, usia compositum; sed in divinis non recipitur materia nec compositum: ergo etc.

name "*hypostases*" ought in no manner be received, and/or the name "*ousia*", because (St. Severinus) Boethius says on the Book of Predicaments,[4] that 'hypostasis' is 'matter', 'ousiosis' 'form', 'ousia' a 'composite'; but in the divine neither matter nor a composite is received: ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hieronymous non dicit, non dicendum,[5] esse tres hypostases, quia falsum esset vel erroneum, sed quia nomen erat inconsuetum, et videbatur sonare idem quod substantia; et substantia secundum communem acceptionem non dicitur pluraliter de personis: et ideo volebat tunc taceri, ne haeretici occasionem acciperent malignandi. Nunc autem illud nomen specificatum est et expressum; ideo modo conceditur.

I respond: It must be said, that (St.) Jerome does not say, that it must not be said,[5] that there are "three hypostases", because it would be false and/or erroneous, but because the name used to be uncustomary, and used to seem to sound the same as "substance"; and "substance" according to the common acceptation is not said plurally of the Persons: and for that reason he wanted at that time to pass over it in silence, lest heretics take occasion to malign (it). But now that name has been specified and expressed; for that reason it is now conceded.

Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, dicendum, quod huiusmodi nomina aliter accipiuntur in philosophia, aliter in theologia; et hoc patet per ipsum[6] Boethium, qui aliter accipit loquens ut philosophus, et aliter loquens ut theologus in libro de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi.[7]

To that which is objected second, it must be said, that names of this kind are accepted in one manner in Philosophy, in another in Theology; and this is clear through (St. Severinus) Boethius himself,[6] who accepts it in one manner, speaking as a philosopher, and in another, speaking as a theologian in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ.[7]

Dub. II.

Doubt II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod dicit, quod *verius est Deus, quam cogitatur*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis fidelis cogitat, Deum esse trinum et unum, et nihil est verius isto: ergo non est verius, quam cogitatur. Item videtur falsum quod dicit, quod *verius cogitatur, quam dicatur*; multa enim dicimus, quae non intelligimus: ergo plus se extendit veritas sermonis quam interioris cogitationis. Item, ego dico, Deus esse summe verum; sed nihil potest verius hoc cogitari nec esse *maius*[8] summe vero: ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St. Augustine) says, that *God is more truly, than is thought*. For he seems to speak a falsehood, because every faithful (Catholic) thinks, that God is Triune and One, and nothing is more true than that: therefore He is not more truly, than He is thought. Likewise it seems false, what he says, that *He is more truly thought, than is said*; for we say many (things), which we do not understand: therefore the truth of speech [veritas sermonis] extends itself more than (the truth) of interior thought. Likewise, I say, that God is most highly True; but nothing can be more truly thought than this nor be *greater*[8] than most highly true: ergo etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sermo Augustini est duplex. Potest enim esse comparatio entis ad ipsum . . .

I respond: It must be said, that the discourse [sermonis] of (St.) Augustine is twofold (in sense). For there can be a comparison of a being to the . . .

[3] Epist. 15. ad Damasum, n. 4, ubi in originali *Taceantur* ponitur pro *Taceamus* et *nomen* omittitur.
[4] Cap. de Substantia, ubi occurrit quidem substantiae divisio, scil. materia, species (forma) et quae ex utriusque conficitur (compositum), sed non appropriatio nominum Graecorum, hypostasis etc. — Paulo ante cod. bb et ed. 1 *nec* pro *vel*.
[5] Vat. cum uno alterove codice omittit *dicendum*. Mox pauci mss. ut W bb *quod* loco *quia*, ac dein aliqui codd. ut A S Y aa cum ed. 1 *et* ac cod. T *aut* pro *vel*.
[6] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic *ipsum*, et mox post *philosophus* particulam *et*, cui cod. O praemittit *in commentario*.
[7] Cap. 3. — Plura de hoc vide supra a. 1. q. 3., et a. 2. q. 1.
[8] Praebemus communiorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1, substituendo *maius* loco *magis verum*; cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *nec esse magis summe verum*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. post *verius* omittunt *hoc*.

[3] Epistle 15, "To Pope Damasus", n. 4, where in the original has *Let the "three hypostases" be passed over in silence* [Taceantur tres hypostases] for *Let us passover in silence the "three hypostases"* [Taceamus tres hypostases], and then omits *a name* [nomen].
[4] In the chapter, "On Substance", where there, indeed, occurs the division of 'substance', into 'matter', 'species' (i.e. 'form') and that which is confected out of each ('the composite'), but not the appropriation of the Greeks names, "hypostasis", etc.. — A little before this codex bb and edition 1 has *nor* [nec] for *and/or* [vel].
[5] The Vatican edition, with one or the other codex, omits *it must be said* [dicendum]. Next a few manuscripts, such as W and bb, have *which* [quod] for *because it* [quia], and then some codices, such as A S Y and aa, together with edition 1, have *and* [et] and codex T *or* [aut] for *and/or* [vel].
[6] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied here *himself* [ipsum], and next after *philosopher* [philosophus], we have inserted *and* [et], which codex O prefaces with *in (his) commentary* [in commentario].
[7] Chapter 3. — See more on this above in a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 1.
[8] We offer the more common reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, by substituting *greater* [maius] in place of *more true* [magis verum]; codex cc, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, reads *nor be more highly true* [nec esse magis summe].

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cogitatum, et cogitati ad *dictum*; et sic non habet veritatem, quia unus et idem est Deus, qui *est* et *cogitatur* et *dicitur*,[1] et aequaliter verus. Potest iterum fieri comparatio ad *actum* essendi et cogitandi et loquendi; et sic habet sermo Augustini veritatem: quoniam Deus in suo esse habet summam veritatem; cogitatio vero nostra cum sit creata et exemplata a summa veritate, non potest esse summe vera; similiter nec locutio, et ideo minus de veritate habet. — Et *rursus*, cum magis assimiletur summe[2] vero actus cogitandi interior quam actus loquendi exterior, magis habet de veritate cogitatio quam locutio, quia Deo est similior. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum primam viam.[3]

thought [cogitatum] itself, and of the thought to the *saying* [dcitum]; and in this manner it does not have truth, because one and the same and equally true is the God, who *is* and *is thought* and *is said*.[1] Again there can be made a comparison to the *act* of being and of thinking and of speaking; and in this manner the discourse of (St.) Augustine has truth: since God in His own "to be" [esse] has most high Truth; but our thinking since it is created and exemplified by the most high Truth, cannot be most highly true; similarly neither (our) speaking, and for that reason it has less of truth. — And *again*, since there is more assimilated to the most highly[2] True the interior act of thinking than the exterior act of speaking, thought has more of truth than speaking, because God is more similar (to it). But the reasons for the opposite proceed according to the first way.[3]

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus,

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of this which (St.)

quod *licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, quia Scriptura non contradicit*; sed similiter, si dicantur non esse tres personae, Scriptura non contradicit: ergo licet dicere, Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum non esse tres pesonas; sed non licet dicere nisi verum: ergo huius oppositum est[4] falsum.

Augustine says, that *the necessity of speaking and disputing allowed one to say "three persons", because Scripture did not contradict (this)*; but similarly, if there are not said to be "three persons", Scripture does not contradict (this): therefore it is licit to say, that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not "three persons"; but it is not licit to say but the truth [verum]: therefore the opposite of this is[4] false.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista non fuit tota ratio dici, sed Augustinus subticet partem causae. Ratio enim fuit, sicut ipse aperit in sequentibus, quia ratio consonabat, et Scriptura non contradicebat. Nam si Scriptura contradiceret, quantumcumque ratio dictaret, non esset dicendum. Et propterea non licuit dicere tres essentias, quia ratio non consonabat. Quare autem ratio magis consonet in hoc nomine *persona* quam in hoc nomine *essentia*, patet, si attendatur significatum utriusque. Ex verbis igitur[5] Augustinis, quae Magister ponit, quare dictum est ab Ecclesia *tres pesonae*, patet, quod triplex fuit ratio. Prima fuit, quia necessitas imminebat; secunda, quia ratio consonabat; tertia, quia Scriptura in nullo contradicebat, immo etiam consonabat. Unde minus dicit et plus intelligit, quando dicit, quod Scriptura non contradicet.

I respond: It must be said, that that was not the whole reason that it was said, but (St.) Augustine left out [subticet] part of the cause. For the reason was, just as he himself reveals [aperit] in the following (passages), that reason was consonant (with it), and Scripture did not contradict (it). For if Scripture contradicted (it), howsoever much reason dictated (it), it would not be said. And on this account it was not licit to say "three essences", because reason was not consonant (with it). But it is clear, why [quare] reason is more consonant in this name "*person*" than in this name "*essence*", if one attends to the signified of each. From the words of (St.) Augustine, therefore,[5] which Master (Peter) posits, it is clear, for what reason "*three persons*" was said by the Church, that it was a threefold reason. The first was, because the necessity was imminent; the second, that reason was consonant; the third, that Scripture contradicted (it) in nothing, nay even was consonant (with it). Wherefore (St. Augustine) says less and understands more, when he says, that Scripture does not contradict (the saying that "there are not three persons".).

Dub. IV.

Doubt IV

Item obiicitur contra illud quod *ibi nulla penitus est diversitas, sicut nec singularitas*; quia si hoc est verum, ergo ibi est omnis[6] identitas: ergo naturae et personae.

Likewise is objected against that which (Master Peter says): *there is thoroughly no diversity There, just as (there is) neither singularity*; because if this is true, therefore there is every[6] identity There: therefore (an identity) of Nature and of Person.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo.[7] *Diversitas* enim attenditur quantum ad principia essentialia sive substantialia. Quia ergo in divinis quantum ad substantialia nulla cadit differentia; ideo dicit, quod nulla diversitas; ideo non sequitur, quod penitus omnimoda[8] est identitas, nisi addatur determinatio, scilicet

I respond: It must be said, that the force (of the expression) must come to be in the word.[7] For "*diversity*" is attained as much as regards essential or substantial principles. Because, therefore, among the divine as much as regards substantial (principles) there occurs no difference; for that reason he says, that there is no

quoad essentialia; et sic patet illud.

diversity; for that reason it does not follow, that there is thoroughly an omnimodal[8] identity, unless there is added a determination, namely, in regard to essential (principles); and in this manner that (objection) is clear.

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[1] Vat. cum cod. cc *et qui cogitatur et qui dicitur*.
[2] Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 *summo*.
[3] Scot., I. Sent. d. 22. q. 1. cum Ocham, Thoma ab Argentina et nonnullis modernis asserit, fieri posse, ut aliquid *distinctius* nominetur, quam cognoscatur, quod sub aliquo respectu concedi posse videtur, quatenus *de facto* aliquis confuse cognoscens interdum nomine praecise significante uti potest. Sed in hoc sensu sententiae et solutioni a S. Bonaventura datae non opponitur.
[4] Verbum *est* desideratur in pluribus mss. Mox post *Respondeo* ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Dicendum*.
[5] Codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures, inter quos sunt G H O Y Z aa cum ed. 1, exhibent lectionem in textum receptam; plures ut L T bb ee ff habent *autem* pro *igitur*; alii demum cum Vat. nullam particulam ponunt. Fide mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus insuper hoc loco *interpunctionem*; Vat. siquidem hanc propositionem *Ex verbis* usque ad *ponit* coniungit cum praecedente et a verbo *quare* novam format propositionem. Sed tunc sensus non convenit cum verbis Augustini, a Magistro (hic c. 3.) relatis, quae non explicant diversum significatum vocabulorum *persona* et *essentia*, sed rationes, quare *tres personas* confitentur Ecclesia. — Paulo superius cod. T *consonabat* pro *consonet*.
[6] Cod. X *omnino*; forte melius et conformius cum ipsa responsione legeretur *omnimoda*.
[7] Id est, verbum *diversitas* in sensu stricto est accipiendum. Hoc modo accipit Aristot., X. Metaph. text 12. (IX. c. 3.) dicens: Differentia vero et diversitas aliud est. Diversum namque et illud, a quo diversum, non est necesse aliquo esse diversum; omne etenim quodcumque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum est. Differens vero ab aliquo, aliquod differens est; quare necesse est aliquid idem esse quo differunt; hoc vero idem, aut genus aut species est etc.
[8] E vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 subsitituimus *omnimoda* pro *omnino*. Dein plurimi codd. omittunt verbum *est*. — De hac solutione cfr. infra d. 24. dub. unic.

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[1] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, reads *and who is thought and who is said* [et qui cogitator et qui dicitur].
[2] The Vatican edition, without the authority of the codices and edition 1, has *most high* [summo].
[3] (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 22, q. 1, together with Ockham, Thomas of Strasbourg and not a few moderns, asserts, that it can come to be, that something is *more distinctly* named, than cognized, which seems able to be conceded under some respect, to the extent that *de facto* someone cognizing in a confused manner, while using a name signifying in a precise manner, can do this. But in this sense it is not opposed by the sentence and solution given by St. Bonaventure.
[4] The verb *is* [est] is wanting in very many manuscripts. Next after *I respond* [Respondeo], we have supplied, from the more ancient codices and edition 1, *It must be said* [Dicendum].
[5] The codices disagree amongst themselves; very many, among which are G H O Y Z and aa, together with edition 1, exhibit the reading received in the text; very many, such as L T bb ee and ff, have *moreover* [autem] for *therefore* [igitur]; then some, together with the Vatican edition, omit any word. Moreover, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have changed *the punctuation* in this passage; indeed the Vatican edition conjoins this same sentence with the preceding and forms a new proposition beginning with the word *for what reason* [quare]. But then the sense does not convene with the words of (St.) Augustine, related by Master (Peter) here in ch. 3, which do not explain the diverse signified of the words "*person*" and "*essence*", but the reasons, why the "Three Persons" are confessed by the Church. — A little above this, codex T has *was more consonant* [magis consonabat] for *is more consonant* [magis consonet].
[6] Codex X has *entirely* [omnimo]; perhaps better and more conform, since the response itself reads *omnimodal* [omnimoda].
[7] That is, the word "*diversity*" is to be accepted in the strict sense. In this manner Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 12 (Bk. IX, ch. 3) accepts it saying: But a difference is one thing and a diversity another. For it is not necessary that the diverse and that, from which (it is) diverse, be diverse in something; for indeed everything, whichever is a being, is either the same or diverse; but in this it is either the same genus or species, etc..
[8] From the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *omnimodal* [omnimoda] for *entirely* [omnino]. Then very many codices omit the verb *there is* [est: in the English translation, this refers to the prior verb]. — On this solution, cf. below d. 24, the sole dubium.

AD LECTOREM.

Publicata prima huius editionis distributione, a pluribus viris eruditis observatum est, expedire, ut deinceps aliquatenus restringamus numerum notarum *criticarum*: satis iam probatum esse, editionem Vaticanam saepe et in minutiis saepissime ab antiquis codicibus dissidere; lectores autem operum S. Bonaventurae fere omnes parum curare, ut in notis ratio reddatur de parvis verborum mutationibus in textu factis, quando ipsae sensum minime tangant. Auctoritate horum virorum confirmati, saepius deinceps corrigemus huiusmodi menda et defectus Vaticanae editionis, quin in notis huius rei mentionem faciamus. Nihil tamen in textu mutabimus, nisi suffulti auctoritate antiquiorum codicum, saltem eorum quibus maior praestanda est fides.

A NOTE TO THE READER

FROM THE QUARACCHI EDITORS

With the first published distribution of this edition, it has been observed by very many erudite men, that it would be expedient, that from here on we restrict to some extent the number of the *critical* notes: it has already been sufficiently proven, that the Vatican edition dissents often and very often in minutia from the ancient codices; moreover the readers of the works of St. Bonaventure nearly all care but a little, that in the notes an account be given of the small changes of words made in the text, when they touch upon the sense in a minimal way. Encouraged by the authority of these men, we shall from now on more frequently correct the errors [menda] and defects of the Vatican edition, without making mention of the matter in the notes. We shall, however, change nothing in the text, unless supported by the authority of the more ancient codices, at least of those which are more worthy of trust.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.